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FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL:
PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES,
AND INALIENABILITY RULES IN TENTH
AMENDMENT INFRASTRUCTURE
ERIN RYAN*
This Article explores the consequences for good governance of
poorly constructed legal infrastructure in the Tenth Amendment context, and recommends a simple jurisprudential fix:
exchanging a property rule for the inalienability remedy rule
that the Supreme Court used to protect the anticommandeering entitlement in New York v. United States.
Grounded in a values-based theory of American federalism,
it shows how the New York inalienability rule unnecessarily
removes tools for resolving interjurisdictional quagmires—
exemplified by the radioactive waste capacity problem at the
heart of the New York litigation—by prohibiting novel forms
of state-federal bargaining.
In New York, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to bind a state’s participation in a regulatory scheme
even if state officials had effectively waived Tenth Amendment–based objections during consensual negotiations with
the federal government. In so doing, the Court articulated a
reasonable entitlement to federal noninterference protected
by an unreasonable inalienability rule. It is an inalienability rule because any number of collective-action problems
would prevent the negotiated transfer of the entitlement except through representation by elected officials. It is unreasonable because the intergovernmental partnerships thus
thwarted would help resolve pressing interjurisdictional
problems without offending the Constitution. Indeed, the
underlying values of federalism that give meaning to the
Tenth Amendment would be better served by allowing a state
to decide for itself whether to hold or trade its entitlement.
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Focusing on the facts and legacy of the New York decision,
this Article concludes that, although its inalienability rule is
defensible in exclusively state or federal jurisdictional contexts, it is dubious in contexts that require regulatory attention at both the local and national level. A property rule
that would enable states to bargain with their anticommandeering entitlement would not offend the touchstone
of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, which has always been
the prevention of federal coercion of the states. A probargaining property rule would be more consistent with the
rest of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence, more faithful to
the full panoply of values that undergird American federalism, and better for state and federal governance in difficult
interjurisdictional contexts.
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CONCLUSION: THE WRONG MORALISM ...................................... 93
INTRODUCTION: THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF LEGAL RULES
As climate change, war in the Middle East, and the price of
oil focus American determination to move beyond fossil fuels,
nuclear power has resurfaced as a possible alternative. But
energy reform efforts may be stalled by an unlikely policy deadlock stemming from a structural technicality in an aging Supreme Court decision: New York v. United States,1 which set
forth the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering rule and
ushered in the New Federalism era in 1992.2 This dry technicality also poses ongoing regulatory obstacles in such critical
interjurisdictional contexts as stormwater management, climate regulation, disaster response, and national security.3
Such is the enormous power hidden in the infrastructure of legal rules, including the property, liability, and inalienability
remedy rules that protect normative legal entitlements.
This Article explores the consequences for good governance
of poorly constructed infrastructure in the Tenth Amendment
context, and recommends a relatively simple jurisprudential
fix: exchanging a property rule for the inalienability remedy
rule that the Court used to protect the anti-commandeering entitlement in New York. Grounded in a values-based theory of
American federalism, the Article shows how the New York inalienability rule unnecessarily removes tools for resolving interjurisdictional quagmires by prohibiting useful forms of
1. 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
2. Broadly, the New Federalism refers to a political movement that gathered
force over the 1980s by advocating renewed respect for distinct spheres of state
and federal power. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18
(2000) (“The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local.” (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995))).
In the landmark New Federalism cases that followed, the Supreme Court rejected
a series of federal laws held to transgress this reinvigorated boundary, beginning
with its holding in New York that the federal government may not “commandeer”
the states by compelling them to regulate. 505 U.S. at 161. For a detailed review
of the Court’s New Federalism Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, see Erin Ryan,
Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 539–67 (2007). The present Article
draws some of its conceptual vocabulary from the broader treatment of federalism
theory in this earlier piece.
3. Ryan, supra note 2, at 567–96 (describing how the New Federalism Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence has created problems for interjurisdictional governance in these contexts); see Christopher Dickey, The Spymaster of New York,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2009, at 40–41 (reporting on conflicts between the CIA and
the NYPD over counter-terrorism intelligence gathering).
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state-federal bargaining.4 The collective-action problem at the
heart of the New York litigation—equitable radioactive waste
management—is exactly this sort of quagmire, as demonstrated by a new round of lawsuits and proposed legislation that
prove it unresolved all these decades later.
The facts of the New York saga are compelling, but the story really begins with the under-sung significance of legal infrastructure. Any given legal rule really implies two—the normative element of the rule (“no parking”), and the legal
consequences that follow when the rule is violated (if you park
there anyway, will the government: fine you? tow your car? revoke your registration?). The normative element is easily recognized and amply debated during the rulemaking, whether
the rule is of legislative, administrative, or judicial origins.
Meanwhile, the remedial element may languish in relative
anonymity—at least until second-order conflicts arise following
general acceptance of the normative rule. (For example, the
common law principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas5
had been long established before jurists began to debate
whether a losing private nuisance defendant should cease the
harmful use or merely compensate the suffering plaintiff.6) Yet
it is the combination of both elements that orders critical aspects of our lives—ranging from private law transactions over
the sale of a house, to public law transactions over government
condemnation of the house, all the way to state and federal
bargaining over how best to regulate radioactive waste near
that house.
This dimension of legal architecture was first explored by
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed in their iconic Harvard
4. In previous work, I have argued that the best way to understand federalism is in terms of the good governance values it seeks to foster, primarily in terms
of the checks and balances between local and national levels of government that
safeguard individual rights, the benefits of variation and innovation that accrue
to localism, the need for governmental accountability that enables meaningful
democratic participation, and the synergistic problem-solving capacity that accords a federal system. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 596–658. In adjudicating difficult jurisdictional issues that raise questions of federalism, faithfulness to these
values should be the touchstone. See id.
5. “Use your property so as not to damage another’s.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1757 app. B (8th ed. 2004).
6. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970) (departing from the traditional approach of prohibiting nuisance harms outright to allow
a defendant cement company to continue its harmful operations, as long as it
compensated neighboring plaintiffs for the harm); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. d (1979) (adopting the Boomer approach for evaluating nuisance remedies).
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Law Review article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of The Cathedral, which describes legal
rules as pairings of an entitlement (designating which of the
conflicting parties will prevail in a given scenario of legal conflict) with a second-order rule indicating how that entitlement
will be vindicated if challenged.7 One View of the Cathedral
(“Cathedral”) identifies three approaches taken by legal rules
to protect the entitlements they establish: the “property rule,”
by which the entitlement is treated as an item of property that
the holder may choose to trade or sell to a competitor; the “liability rule,” by which the competitor may usurp the entitlement
over the holder’s protest so long as the loss is compensated; and
the more sparingly used “inalienability rule,” which forbids
shifting an entitlement from its assigned holder regardless of
the parties’ wishes.8 It details different circumstances in which
each approach will most faithfully serve the intended purposes
of the rule,9 and suggests that entitlements and remedies are
not always well matched in this regard.10
Thus, although the substance of the entitlement may
preoccupy rulemakers at the outset, it is often this secondary
aspect of the rule that becomes the more persisting subject of
legal controversy. Many authors have employed the Cathedral
framework of analysis to critique underperforming legal rules
in the common law contexts that Calabresi and Melamed addressed directly,11 but others have shown that the framework
proves robust even at the constitutional level, where the normative elements of legal rules are often more clear from the
7. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972).
8. Id. at 1092–93.
9. These circumstances often relate to confidence levels in the rulemakers’
assumptions about the initial allocation of entitlements. For example, property
rules enable efficient bargaining between competitors when the initial allocation
of entitlements is uncertain, liability rules ensure socially desirable transfer
against holdouts when the least cost avoider is uncertain, and inalienability rules
protect what the authors call a “moralism,” or a policymaking consensus that a
preordained outcome is worth the resulting sacrifice in autonomy and efficiency
values. Id. at 1112.
10. Id. at 1118–24 (discussing how different remedy rules may advance different goals associated with the substantive entitlement).
11. A recent sampling includes: Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements
as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703
(1997); Henry Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004);
Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty about Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (2008).
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text than remedial elements that courts must sometimes infer
jurisprudentially.12 From ongoing friction over the explicit liability rule in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause (enabling
the state to condemn private property for public use so long as
market value is paid)13 to debate over the coercive overuse of
property rule-enabled plea bargains (alleged to distort the
criminal law bargaining process to the point of vitiating the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial),14 many of today’s most
compelling constitutional controversies involve the secondorder, remedial aspect of the operative legal rule. Constitutional federalism now joins these ranks, as the casual insertion
into New York of an ill-considered inalienability rule—one that
obstructs intergovernmental bargaining around uncertain
Tenth Amendment entitlements15—threatens to further exacerbate regulatory dilemmas that require the negotiation of
unique state-federal partnerships.
A most alarming example is the crisis that first led to the
New York controversy twenty-five years ago: our seriously
dwindling capacity for handling radioactive waste that nobody
wants in the backyard. The entrenched problem of safe and
equitable radioactive waste management is again making
headlines, thanks to the 2008 closure to national waste traffic
of the Barnwell disposal site in South Carolina that had indi-

12. E.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (2005);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing,
and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143, 1144
(1999).
13. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Roderick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1474 (2008) (critiquing the eminent domain liability rule that
under-compensates owners with market price for property they did not wish to
part with in the first place, even at market rates).
14. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
851, 864 (1995) (observing that prosecutors sometimes overcharge a defendant in
the absence of sufficient evidence to extract a plea bargain for a lesser offense);
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1909–10 (1992) (noting that most legal scholars find plea bargaining “both
inefficient and unjust”); Joseph P. Fried, New York Judge Rejects Death Penalty
Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1997, at A1 (reporting on judicial concerns that
plea provisions of the death penalty law allow prosecutors to coerce guilty pleas
from capital defendants).
15. See infra Part II.C (explicating the inalienability rule effected by the
Court’s conclusion that New York State could not have consented to the Act’s requirement (that it either site a disposal facility or take title to the radioactive
waste generated within its borders) on grounds that states can never consent to
be bound by this kind of federal law).
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rectly inspired the New York dispute in the first place.16
Barnwell had been processing the majority of the nation’s lowlevel radioactive waste for the better part of the last halfcentury, as one of only three sites nationwide accepting this
most common form of radioactive waste (produced by the use of
nuclear material in commercial applications ranging from power plants to consumer products).17 South Carolina resented becoming a dumping ground for other states’ toxic waste and first
threatened to close the Barnwell doors in 1979, prompting a
national panic and Congress’s first attempts to resolve the
problem.18 Respectful of the federalism implications of creating
a new national regulatory regime, Congress adopted a state-led
approach proposed by the National Governors Association
when it passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
(“the Act”)19 and subsequent amendments, which required each
state to take responsibility for disposing of the waste produced
within its borders by a set deadline (or “take title” to that
waste).20
But in an effort to make its own rhetorical point about federalism, the Supreme Court eviscerated the Act’s “take-title”
enforcement provision in New York, holding that Congress
lacked the authority to bind a state’s participation in the plan
even if state officials had effectively waived Tenth Amendment–based objections during consensual negotiations with the
federal government.21 Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor
explained that a state may not waive its anti-commandeering
entitlement (prohibiting the federal government from compelling the state to regulate) because the Tenth Amendment protects rights held not by the state qua state but by its citizens as
individuals.22 In so doing, the Court articulated a reasonable
16. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150 (1992) (describing how
South Carolina’s earlier threats to close Barnwell to national traffic led to the
passage of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act); Judy Fahys, Industry
Recipe: Diluted N-Waste, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 28, 2008 (reporting on the closure
of Barnwell to all but three other states as of July 2008).
17. See, e.g., Stevenson Swanson, Clock Is Ticking on Available Sites for Disposing Nuclear Waste: States Seek New Places to Bury Radioactive Debris, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 14, 1993, at 13.
18. See infra notes 110–21 and accompanying text.
19. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347
(1980) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021d (2006)).
20. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 § 5(d)(2)(C),
Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 1850, declared unconstitutional by New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
21. New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
22. Id.
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entitlement to federal noninterference protected by an unreasonable inalienability rule. Prohibiting state government from
bargaining with the entitlement creates an inalienability rule
because any number of collective-action problems would prevent the negotiated transfer of the entitlement except through
representation by elected officials.23 It is unreasonable because
the intergovernmental partnerships thus thwarted would help
resolve pressing interjurisdictional problems without offending
the Tenth Amendment. Indeed, underlying values of American
federalism that give meaning to the Tenth Amendment would
be better served by allowing a state to decide for itself whether
to hold or trade its entitlement.
New York’s subtle inalienability rule attracted much less
attention than the substantive anti-commandeering rule that it
protected, but the consequences of inalienability are currently
front-page news, now that Barnwell is finally closed to national
waste shipments, three additional decades of waste have accumulated, and no new disposal capacity to absorb it has been
created since New York extracted what teeth in the Act might
have compelled it. The capacity crisis has taken on added urgency as policymakers revisit nuclear power as an alternative
source of energy, especially now that the only disposal site accepting nationwide waste has contracted to also accept shipments from Europe.24 Fears that this would further strain domestic capacity prompted protest from the other states in its
regional compact, bills in both houses of Congress to prevent
the importation of internationally produced waste, and a proposal under consideration by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reduce the capacity crisis simply by shifting more toxic
forms of waste into less stringently regulated categories.25 No
thanks to the New York inalienability rule, the low-level radioactive waste crisis languishes with no solution in sight.
This Article explores how Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral framework can help us understand the interjurisdictional
gridlock that has arisen under the New Federalism Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence in infrastructural terms—and more
importantly, how to resolve it at the infrastructural level. It
23. See infra Part II.C. For an analogous argument in the property law context, see Richard A. Epstein, Comment, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the
Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1367 (1982) (arguing that a property
owner’s ability to hold out is one of our legal system’s “essential strengths”).
24. See infra text accompanying note 180.
25. See infra Part II.D.
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proceeds from a theoretical account of the Tenth Amendment
as the guardian of American federalism by vindicating the dual
sovereignty directive, charged with protecting the principles of
good government that underlie our system of dual sovereignty.26 These include the maintenance of checks and balances between state and federal power to safeguard individual rights,
the protection of local autonomy to promote interjurisdictional
variation and innovation, the enhancement of public accountability to enable meaningful democratic participation by voters,
and the facilitation of synergistic approaches to regulatory
problem solving that accord the federalist structure.27 By this
account (which I have outlined in previous work), the Tenth
Amendment polices regulatory activity at the margins of state
and federal authority for impermissible compromises of these
fundamental federalism values.28 This account departs from
the New Federalism’s idealization of a bright-line boundary between mutually exclusive spheres of state and federal authority, out of recognition for the thorny regulatory problems—like
radioactive waste management—that do not fit precisely within one sphere or the other.29
26. Ryan, supra note 2, at 518–22 (reviewing the Constitution’s dual sovereignty directive and identifying ambiguities that require interpretation according
to an extrinsic theoretical model of federalism).
27. Id. at 596–628 (outlining the fundamental federalism values and discussing the tensions among them). The good governance values that undergird American federalism are well understood in previous federalism scholarship with the
exception of the underappreciated problem-solving value, which arises from the
subsidiarity ethic—that governance take place at the most local level possible, or
that level with sufficient capacity to successfully address the problem at hand. Id.
at 620–28. The problem-solving value is also indicated in the constitutional choice
of a federal system after the failure of the decentralizing Articles of Confederation
to realize efficient interstate commerce, to provide for the common defense, and to
resolve interstate disputes. Id. at 619. James Madison invoked the problemsolving value in defending the Constitution in the Federalist Papers, urging that
the distribution of power it contemplated was needed to accomplish the goals of
the new government:
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, . . . not that the people of
America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the governments of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments,
might enjoy a certain extent of power and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty?
Id. at 621–22 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 288–89 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
28. Id. at 644–62 (outlining the role of the Tenth Amendment within the Balanced Federalism theoretical model).
29. Id. at 567–95 (describing how an interjurisdictional gray area betrays the
New Federalism’s preferred model of strict-separationist dual sovereignty); see
also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
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Focusing on the facts and legacy of the New York decision,
this Article concludes that although the inalienability rule is
defensible in exclusively state or federal jurisdictional contexts,
it is dubious in contexts that require regulatory attention at
both the local and national level.30 The failing interstate market for radioactive waste disposal demonstrates the interjurisdictional dilemma: Congress could regulate the market under
its commerce authority, but the siting of specific waste
processing facilities must ultimately conform to state and local
land-use laws that mediate impacts on local communities, making it better resolved with the benefit of both federal and state
expertise. In this “gray area” of overlapping local and national
concern, state and federal regulators must find ways to work
together—occasionally by negotiating partnerships that blur
the bright-line boundary the New Federalism imagines between idealized spheres of exclusively state or federal
jurisdiction.31
In these negotiations, the media of exchange are the reciprocal entitlements to sovereign authority and regulatory noninterference delineated by the Tenth Amendment, which affirms that the Constitution delegates some forms of sovereign
authority to the federal government while leaving others with
the states.32 Entitlements to authority at the margin of this
division were the bargaining chips at hand when the states negotiated with Congress to create the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act. However, the New York inalienability rule
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV.
813, 831–32, 938–39 (1998) (deeming the New Federalism’s view of mutually exclusive state and federal regulatory spheres “palpably untrue”); Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2180, 2196 (1998) (discussing the “outmoded” basis for the New Federalism
dual sovereignty approach); Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism:
Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1564–66 (1994) (critiquing the New Federalism model’s reliance on the territorial view of federalism).
30. Ryan, supra note 2, at 572–84 (describing interjurisdictional regulatory
problems); see also id. at 514, 570 (limiting the discussion of “regulatory problems”
to the classic targets of administrative law, including “market failures, negative
externalities, and other collective-action problems that individuals are illequipped to resolve on their own”).
31. See id. at 539–67 (reviewing how the Rehnquist Court’s Tenth Amendment and preemption jurisprudence reify a “strict separationist” ideal of New Federalism dual sovereignty).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also Ryan, supra note 2, at 519–20 (reviewing
what is made certain and what is left unclear under the Tenth Amendment dual
sovereignty directive).
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makes such intergovernmental negotiation so much more difficult that none has occurred in the sixteen years since the rule
toppled the last attempt, setting the stage for the renewed crisis that is again demanding lawmakers’ attention.
Other efforts at interjurisdictional problem solving have
also been stunted under the bright-line approach to segregating state and federal jurisdiction, leading to unnecessary regulatory uncertainty,33 gridlock,34 litigation,35 and even outright
abdication.36 Because the New Federalism ideal does not reflect the jurisdictional realities of American governance, many
scholars (myself included) have suggested that the Court turn
to other models of federalism for inspiration.37 However, this
Article demonstrates that progress is attainable even within
the existing New Federalism paradigm, simply by matching its
normative Tenth Amendment rule with a more appropriate
remedial rule.
Specifically, the inalienability remedy should be replaced
with a property rule, at least in the gray area. Enabling additional opportunities to bargain around New Federalism’s bright
line of jurisdictional separation could alleviate some of the obstacles that have plagued interjurisdictional problem solving
since New York was decided. Indeed, in prohibiting bargainedfor state waiver of the anti-commandeering entitlement, New

33. For example, much regulatory uncertainty currently attends wetlands
regulation. See infra note 235 (discussing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 731–32 (2006)).
34. A prime example is that regarding the disposal of low-level radioactive
waste. See infra Part II.D.
35. One example of such litigation was the Tenth Amendment challenge to
the state-federal partnership at the heart of the Clean Water Act’s Phase II
Stormwater Rule. See infra notes 213–18 and accompanying text.
36. The failed response to Hurricane Katrina has been so characterized. E.g.,
Peggy Noonan, The Scofflaw Swimmer: Government Takes Too Much Authority
and Not Enough Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2005, http://www.opinion
journal.com/columnists/pnoonan/?id=110007328 (“No one took charge. Thus the
postgame commentary in which everyone blamed someone else: The mayor fumbled the ball, the governor didn’t call the play, the president didn’t have a ground
game.”).
37. E.g., Hills, supra note 29, at 816–17, 938–44 (arguing for local autonomy
on a functional basis); John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18–22 (2006) (advancing a model of integrated federalism); Ryan, supra note 2, at 644–65 (advocating a model of Balanced Federalism that better mediates between competing
federalism values in the interjurisdictional gray area); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV.
1409, 1466–68 (1999) (proposing that federal and state courts participate together
in developing constitutional law).
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York’s inalienability rule ironically extinguishes what would
otherwise be the New Federalism’s most promising means of
advancing interjurisdictional collaboration in a way that would
honor all federalism values. As with all bright-line rules, one
potential advantage of the New Federalism’s jurisdictional line
is the clarity it creates about who has what for the purposes of
state-federal bargaining. Applying Coasian insight, bargaining
protects us against errors in assigning the initial legal entitlement under conditions of uncertainty,38 and uncertainty is a
serious concern when drawing a line of jurisdictional separation through the haze of overlapping state and federal interests
at the margin between them. The jurisdictional clarity New
Federalism seeks to protect could thus be harnessed to facilitate negotiations that may be needed when state and federal
regulators must collaborate at the margins of their jurisdictional allocation. But the inalienability rule chills bargaining
around that line, unnecessarily abrogating the possibility of
consensual state-federal partnerships in the tricky interjurisdictional contexts that need it most.
Worse, it does so without a satisfying rationale from the
Court. The majority suggested that state sovereign authority
is an inherently unwaivable entitlement,39 but this stands in
stark contrast to other federalism entitlements to the same authority that are protected by property rules, such as the waivable Eleventh Amendment entitlement to state sovereign immunity and trades negotiated under the federal spending
power.40 The majority also worried that elected representatives’ interests could stray dangerously from those of their constituents, but this generic problem of representational democracy is actually least pressing in the Tenth Amendment
context, where citizen and representative interests substantially overlap.41 The bargaining medium is the very state sovereignty that empowers even the most self-interested state representatives, who are unlikely to bargain away their own base
38. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960)
(arguing that efficient results can be achieved when parties can bargain, so long
as transaction costs are low). As with all bright-line rules, one potential advantage of the New Federalism’s jurisdictional line is the clarity it creates about who
has what for the purposes of state-federal bargaining. Whether or not the line is
correctly drawn, at least the parties are on clear notice about which level of government has been designated which jurisdictional entitlements.
39. See infra Part III.B.
40. See infra Part III.B.1.
41. See infra Part III.B.2.
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of authority unless it is the only way to meet important interests of their constituents.42
In contrast, a property rule that would enable states to
bargain with their entitlement would not offend the touchstone
of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, which has always been the
prevention of federal “coercion” of the states.43 The consensual
nature of state-federal negotiation means that each state would
decide for itself whether to alienate the entitlement in each instance. In this respect, a property rule approach would better
serve the federalism values of local autonomy (locating decisional authority at the local level), interjurisdictional innovation (allowing for the diversity of response that engenders the
federalism “laboratory of ideas”), and problem-solving synergy
(fostering intergovernmental partnerships to cope with interjurisdictional problems). It would offer sufficient protection for
check-and-balance federalism values, because a state will not
bargain against its powerful interest in maintaining the balance of state and federal power unless offsetting, problemsolving values justify the trade-off—as all of the states believed
when they negotiated the terms of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act. Indeed, bargaining is a time-honored
means—and perhaps the only means—of enabling parties who
lack consensus on the perfect to move forward toward the good,
relying on the contract law presumption that the parties themselves are best situated to evaluate whether the deal serves
their true interests.44
By prohibiting state-federal bargaining around a very uncertain line, the inalienability rule ossifies errors in the initial
allocation of jurisdictional entitlements and subverts the role of
the Tenth Amendment by undermining the very federalism
values it exists to protect. When a remedy rule proves so
sweeping that it threatens to reconfigure the substantive
meaning of the normative rule it protects, that is a strong signal that normative and remedial elements have been mismatched at the level of legal infrastructure—and that interven42. See infra Part III.B.2.
43. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166–69 (1992).
44. Even federalism scholars concerned about the potential for state-federal
collusion around federalism constraints concede that the commandeering context
is the least vulnerable to this problem. See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 89, 119 (2004) (warning that states may collude with the federal
government in undermining federalism constraints, but acknowledging that this
is least likely in the context of commandeering).
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tion is warranted. A pro-bargaining property rule would be
more consistent with the rest of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence, more faithful to the full panoply of values that undergird American federalism, and better for state and federal
governance in the gray area. Part I reviews the Cathedral
framework’s exegesis of legal infrastructure, and addresses its
application in the context of constitutional federalism. Part II
explores how the New York case establishes the inalienability
of the anti-commandeering entitlement, and the consequences
of inalienability in gray areas of interjurisdictional concern.
Part III proposes the change to a property rule approach and
refutes the Court’s rationale for the New York inalienability
rule as both theoretically and pragmatically weak.
I.

THE CATHEDRAL FRAMEWORK

Legal rules structure civil society, but their own architecture is easily overlooked, sometimes at great societal cost. This
Part introduces the Cathedral framework as a way of understanding legal infrastructure, and the various benefits that
architects of legal rules may secure in choosing among the different remedial alternatives for vindicating the normative entitlement at the heart of a given legal rule. After reviewing
how scholars have applied the framework in other public law
contexts, it explores how the Supreme Court has applied the
framework inconsistently across distinct doctrinal realms within its federalism jurisprudence. It also responds to potential
skepticism about the applicability of the framework to federalism bargaining, noting the ways that state-federal bargaining
approximates private market bargaining even more closely
than other forms of governmental bargaining.
A.

The Cathedral in Private Law Contexts

The Cathedral framework draws from tort, property, and
criminal law in unifying a set of conceptual tools for choosing
among different approaches to protecting the assignment of legal entitlements.45 As described above, legal rules mediate between parties with conflicting interests in some legal sphere,
and a legal rule’s first job is to decide which of the parties’ interests will be privileged as a substantive matter. In so doing,
45.

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1089–90.
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the rule confers on the privileged party a legal entitlement—a
right to do (or not do) something, or to have (or not have) something happen to her—be it the entitlement to exclude a competitor from a given parcel of land, the entitlement to practice
one’s religion despite the neighbors’ opposition, or the entitlement to use a crosswalk without being run over by lawful automobile traffic. The second, less-celebrated job of the legal
rule is to structure the scope of permissible transactions involving this assigned entitlement. To this end, as between the privileged holder and those with competing interests, the law will
vindicate the entitlement in one of three ways: by a property
rule, a liability rule, or an inalienability rule.
If the entitlement is protected under a property rule, its
holder has absolute power to convey the entitlement away for a
satisfactory price. This approach treats the entitlement like an
item of personal property, enabling the holder to protect it
against all challengers or trade it on the open market at will.
It represents the most common remedy rule in property law—
for example, governing most private real estate transactions,
where an owner sells her house in the marketplace only if she
so desires, and then on her own terms.46
If the entitlement is protected under a liability rule, it may
be purchased at an objectively determined price by the competitor even without the holder’s consent.47 This is the most common remedy rule in tort law—where accident victims are not
usually given the ex ante opportunity to bargain away their entitlement not to be victims of negligently inflicted harm, but in
which the law compensates them for the loss of that entitlement by requiring the competitor (here, the tortfeasor) to compensate them in the form of objectively determined damages.
However, the liability rule has also gained traction in property
and other areas of law under the influence of the Law and Economics school, which suggests that legal rules promote general
societal utility over individual autonomy in cases where holdouts or other collective-action problems could derail socially
desirable outcomes. For example, in the landmark Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co.48 private nuisance decision, the court departed from the traditional approach requiring abatement of
the nuisance to protect the plaintiff’s entitlement to be free of
harm, and instead allowed a socially valuable factory use to
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1092.
Id.
257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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continue (because it paid taxes and employed many local residents) so long as it compensated neighboring homeowners for
their losses. The Restatement of Torts now adopts the liability
rule remedy for private nuisance.49
The final approach is one of inalienability, by which the
entitlement is held to rest where it is initially laid by the law,
and any attempted transfer by either party is legally unenforceable.50 This is a common remedy rule in criminal law (where
consent is not a defense to murder or statutory rape),51 but it is
also found in other areas of law. For example, in the common
law of property, the implied warranty of habitability establishes an entitlement to renters for a minimum standard of safety
and sanitation in rental housing that cannot be negotiated
away, even between a willing landlord and tenant happy to
bargain for less safety at less rent.52
Calabresi and Melamed propose various reasons for using
property, liability, and inalienability rules to accomplish the
goals of well-ordered legal rules. For example, they suggest
that property rules be used whenever the cheapest cost avoider
can be identified, because it enables interparty bargaining that
ensures the entitlement ultimately reaches the most efficient
destination even if an error is made in the initial assignment.53
The choice of to whom to assign the entitlement as an initial
matter is still an important decision, of course, since it may
create significant distributional consequences for the parties.
However, even the procedural clarity yielded by property rules
is subject to the usual caveats of the Coase Theorem’s limiting
assumptions,54 and so Calabresi and Melamed also note that
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. d (1979) (noting that “[i]t
may be reasonable to continue an important activity if payment is made for the
harm it is causing”).
50. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1092–93.
51. For example, Florida prohibits murder even when the victim consents.
FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (2007). Oregon does not allow persons under the age of eighteen to consent to a sexual act. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(1)(a) (2007).
52. Some jurisdictions describe the implied warranty of habitability as a covenant for basic rental housing services. E.g., Acad. Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 268
A.2d 556, 559 (Essex County Ct. 1970) (“In a modern society one cannot be expected to live in a multi-storied apartment building without heat, hot water, garbage disposal or elevator service. Failure to supply such things is a breach of the
implied covenant of habitability.”).
53. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1118. The “cheapest cost avoider”
refers to that party to a given conflict who is able to forestall the harm at issue at
the lowest expense or with the least investment of resources.
54. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 38, at 15–16 (assuming the absence of transaction costs).
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property rules can lead to inefficient results when transaction
costs are high (especially when multiple parties are associated
with classic collective-action problems, such as holdouts or freeloaders).55
By contrast, liability rules are useful when there is uncertainty at the outset about the identity of the cheapest cost
avoider, and where transaction costs or collective-action problems would impede efficient bargaining over the entitlement.56
In either case, the liability rule ensures that a socially desirable transaction may proceed even if the entitlement holder protests57—as does the law of eminent domain, which enables the
government to condemn land for highways and airports by paying fair market value even if one or more of the owners of targeted properties would rather not sell. However, liability rules
can lead to troubling distributional effects (where the efficient
result is partly determined by the parties’ relative ability to
pay), and can also create problems from an efficiency standpoint. Specifically, the objectively determined price of the entitlement will only approximate its value to the unwilling entitlement holder, which can complicate the realization of an
efficient result through market-approximating mechanisms.58
For example, the payment of fair market value for eminent
domain condemnations is frequently criticized as undercompensating unwilling property owners by definition, because
if they really only valued the land at the prevailing market
price, they presumably would have already sold it on the open
market.59
Inalienability rules ensure specific outcomes to protect
what Calabresi and Melamed call a “moralism,” by which they
55. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1119.
56. Id.
57. The liability rule ensures the efficient result regardless of initial allocation because if a competitor values the entitlement more than the initial holder,
she may purchase it even over the holder’s dissent. Where uncertainty hampers
the initial allocation, the authors suggest that the law could assign the entitlement based on the ex ante costs of each side in determining its implied harms or
benefits. Id. at 1107–10.
58. Id. at 1120.
59. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (acknowledging that market price “does not necessarily compensate for all values an
owner may derive from his property”); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 183 (1985) (“The central
difficulty of the market value formula for explicit compensation . . . is that it denies any compensation for real but subjective values.”); Heller & Hills, supra note
13, at 1474 (critiquing the eminent domain liability rule for necessarily undercompensating reluctant private owners).
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mean a strong policymaking consensus preferring some desired
outcome despite the resulting efficiency and autonomy losses
that the assignment of an inalienability rule inevitably implies.60 In this way, inalienability may be used to serve a policy of paternalism (to protect legal actors under some kind of
disability, such as minors with regard to statutory rape), or to
achieve a preferred distributional preference in light of some
compelling public policy (such as affirmative action).61 For example, the implied warranty of habitability reflects a societal
consensus about minimum levels of residential safety, despite
its frustration of bargains that some landlords and tenants
might otherwise reach for less expensive, less safe housing.
From the standpoint of Law and Economics, the problem
with inalienability rules is that they prioritize other policy concerns over economic efficiency (if, as is often the case, these
subjective concerns cannot be assigned a reliably measurable
economic value).62 That said, inalienability rules are not always used in opposition to efficiency; Calabresi and Melamed
note that they are occasionally appropriate to avoid the wasteful costs of setting up a market to shift an entitlement for
which there is no actual demand.63 Still, they are most often
deployed where the pursuit of efficiency takes a backseat to a
countervailing policy concern. From the libertarian standpoint,
the problem with inalienability rules is that they prioritize other policy concerns over individual autonomy. If there is not
perfect consensus about the public policy privileged by the inalienability rule, then those who disagree with the policy may
acutely object to this loss of all transactional control over the
entitlement.
B.

The Cathedral in the Public Law Context

The Cathedral framework originates in the private law
context, but it is also meaningful in describing constitutional
entitlements—as well as the infrastructural problems that can
60. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1111–12, 1123–24.
61. Id. at 1113–14.
62. Some authors describe them as “public goods” that are hard to valuate
economically. See, e.g., David S. Brookshire & Don L. Coursey, Measuring the
Value of a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation Procedures, 77
AM. ECON. REV. 554, 554 (1987) (considering the “practical problems” associated
with measuring the value of public goods); Sameer H. Doshi, Making the Sale on
Contingent Valuation, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 296 (2008).
63. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1123–24.
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arise when courts must jurisprudentially infer what remedy
rule should attach to an otherwise clearly stated normative
rule. Some constitutional entitlements, such as individual
rights, are easily analogized to the standard private law entitlements to do or have something. Other constitutional entitlements allocate jurisdictional authority to different governmental actors, and assign limits to that authority. Although
these more structural entitlements stray farther from the original Cathedral inquiry, the framework remains surprisingly
powerful in clarifying what happens when they are challenged,
and offers useful analytical tools for courts that must determine remedies jurisprudentially.
The scholarly consensus is that most constitutional entitlements are protected under a property rule,64 although Professor Eugene Kontorovich has recently demonstrated many
instances of hidden liability rules.65 Still, all three varieties
can be found in constitutional law, some specified in the text
and others jurisprudentially. For example, a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial is treated as protected by a
property rule, since she can bargain it away in exchange for a
64. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 115, 239 n.112 (1997) (arguing that constitutional
rights should not be transformed into “takings-clause-like ‘liability’ rights” because it would allow the government to “cynically treat violations of sacred constitutional rights merely as the cost of doing business”); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE
L.J. 1, 93–94 (1988) (arguing that constitutional rights are properly protected
with property rules rather than liability rules because “dignitary relationships
between citizen and government” cannot be monetized and attempts to do so
would, from the expressive perspective, devalue important political rights); Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 1138 (applying the framework to constitutional entitlements and remedies in general and suggesting that the dominant trend is to
view constitutional entitlements as requiring property rule protection); David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7,
19 n.36, 19–20 (1999) (suggesting that the “only conceivable notion of constitutional rights” entails “prophylactic protection from potential infringements” and
that the Warren Court subscribed to such a property rule view of constitutional
rights); Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1135 n.325 (2001) (observing that constitutional rights are
presumptively protected by property rules); cf. Erik G. Luna, The Models of Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 436 (1999) (arguing that Fourth
Amendment doctrine should seek to prevent unconstitutional conduct rather than
compensate it, and that the government should not be able to “ ‘purchase’ supposedly inalienable constitutional rights through the expediency of a liability rule”).
65. Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 1138 (suggesting that although the dominant trend is to view constitutional entitlements as requiring property rule protection, the use of liability rules is widespread); Eugene Kontorovich, Liability
Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV.
755, 758 (2004).
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plea agreement that she would rather have. Although land is
generally protected under a property rule in the private market, an owner’s Fifth Amendment right against government
appropriation for public use is protected under an explicit liability rule, since the state may take it over her dissent so long
as just compensation is paid.66 Meanwhile, the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition of slavery confers an entitlement to
freedom zealously guarded by an inalienability rule, since even
a consensual agreement to sell oneself into slavery will be legally unenforceable.67 Voting rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment are also protected under an inalienability
rule (and even more explicitly so by state law), since an enfranchised citizen cannot legally trade her right to vote to someone
else.68
Applying the Cathedral framework to constitutional entitlements generates some controversy: some suggest that it is
heretical to speak of remedies for constitutional violations at
all, because it implies that unconstitutional acts are permissi-

66. Professor Eugene Kontorovich has also coined the “pliability rule” combination of property and liability rules in certain areas of constitutional law, including takings, since the liability rule for public-use takings is paired with a property
rule for non-public-use takings. See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 1161. An even
more explicit pliability rule can be found in the Third Amendment proscription on
quartering troops on private property during peace time without the owner’s permission—an explicit constitutional property rule that is less conspicuously paired
with an implied liability rule protecting the entitlement during wartime. Id. at
1140.
67. Professor Thomas Merrill has proposed a variation on the Cathedral
framework to better describe entitlements in the public law context, in which he
suggests an alternate basis for inalienability rules. Merrill, supra note 12, at
1143–44 (applying the framework to constitutional rights within the context of the
government’s efforts to reduce smoking). In his view, an inalienability rule is useful whenever the value of keeping the entitlement where it is initially allocated is
worth more to the public than it is to the holder of the initial allocation, thus preventing socially undesirable transfers of publicly valuable allocations. See id. at
1154. Merrill’s suggestion is a useful way of understanding the Cathedral “moralism” in the public law context, but it ultimately breaks down to the same way of
understanding Calabresi and Melamed’s “moralism” this Article uses: a policymaking consensus about a desired outcome that outweighs the resulting efficiency
and autonomy losses implied by the inalienability rule.
68. See Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1709
(1999) (“The law treats voting as a ‘market-inalienable’ activity: Votes can be given away (indeed, they get most of their meaning from being ‘cast’), but they cannot be sold, at least not directly.”); Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 111, 116 (2000) (“It is possible to think of voting as unique but it is also
defensible to think of voting rights as contained in a class of things generally held
inalienable.”).
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ble so long as they are remedied appropriately.69 However, using the framework to better understand our most foundational
legal rules does not undermine constitutional limits, it merely
characterizes more accurately the inherent limits built into the
underlying constitutional entitlements. In other words, speaking of the liability rule protecting private property against condemnation for public use does not cheapen the Fifth Amendment right to private property, it just accurately characterizes
the remedy rule effectively built in to the constitutional grant.
Either way, as Professor Kontorovich has argued, the distinction is ultimately about whether the essential negotiation over
shifting an entitlement happens ex ante (as it does under a
property rule) or ex post (as it does under a liability rule)—or
not at all (as it does not under an inalienability rule).70
C.

Federalism at the Cathedral

The Supreme Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence
shows the same array of choices among remedy rules for protecting assigned entitlements. Like other constitutional entitlements, most created by the rules of constitutional federalism are protected under a property rule. For example, a state’s
Eleventh Amendment entitlement to sovereign immunity from
citizen suit71 is protected by a property rule, because the state
can choose to waive the entitlement by consenting to an otherwise barred suit.72 In the New Federalism era, the Supreme
Court has defended its strong protection of a state’s rights
under the Eleventh Amendment by characterizing the entitlement to sovereign immunity as a core attribute of statehood—
one that cannot be casually abrogated without posing dire
consequences for the success of the state as an enterprise of
government.73 However, in keeping with its general approach
69. E.g., Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 1138 (“Limiting remedies to ex post
money damages (thereby adopting a liability rule) is widely thought of as incompatible with constitutional values.”).
70. See id. at 1137.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
72. Jackson, supra note 64, at 89; see also Seamon, supra note 64, at 1135.
73. E.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). The Court noted:
“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much
for what it says, but for the presupposition[s] . . . which it confirms.” . . .
[F]irst, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and
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of protecting entitlements under a property rule, the Court has
also consistently held that the Constitution does not prohibit a
state from trading away this entitlement of its own accord.74
Similarly, the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction under
the Commerce Clause and other federally enumerated powers
is also protected by a property rule, as demonstrated by the
Court’s concomitant Spending Clause jurisprudence. Although
the Commerce Clause grants a zone of positive jurisdictional
authority to the federal government,75 the entitlement can also
be understood as a reciprocal entitlement to the states for federal regulatory noninterference beyond the designated limits
(and it is this aspect of the Commerce Clause rule that has
most interested the Court since the New Federalism revival).76
However, the federal government frequently uses its spending
power to negotiate with the states for expanded regulatory jurisdiction beyond the limits of the commerce power or its other
enumerated powers.77 When this happens, a state is essentially bargaining away its constitutional entitlement to federal
noninterference in the relevant regulatory zone,78 much as an
second, that “ ‘[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.’ ”
Id. (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Blatchford v. Native
Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961))).
74. E.g., In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (repeating the constitutional proscription of citizen suits against a state unless “consent [is] given”). A state
may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity if it does so explicitly. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“[W]e will find waiver only where stated ‘by the
most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ ” (second alteration in
original) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909))).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes . . . .”).
76. In several of its most famous New Federalism decisions, the Court emphasized the limits of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Solid Waste
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (invalidating federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction over isolated intrastate wetlands); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (invalidating federal civil remedies
under the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
77. E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding Congress’s use of the spending power to persuade states to enact a minimum drinking
age).
78. For example, even as the Court held that Congress lacked constitutional
authority to require the states to take the challenged actions, it noted that Congress remained free to persuade the states to do so using its power under the
Spending Clause. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166–67 (1992).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1350008

2010]

FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL

23

individual defendant might trade away her property-ruleprotected Sixth Amendment entitlement to a jury trial in a plea
agreement with the prosecution. For example, the federal government was able to persuade most states to reduce their speed
limits during the gas crisis of the 1970s by conditioning their
receipt of federal highway funds on the adoption of a fifty-five
mile per hour maximum on interstate highways.79
In the background of these reciprocal federal and state entitlements lurks the Tenth Amendment, promising a system of
dual sovereignty in which the state and federal governments
play distinct roles.80 It is the penumbral effect of the Tenth
Amendment that creates the reciprocal state entitlement
whenever the Constitution grants a limited power to the federal government, such as the federal power to regulate interstate
commerce. The state receives a reciprocal entitlement for federal noninterference beyond the limits thereby implied, such as
the Court has found with regard to the regulation of domestic
violence81 or hydrologically isolated wetlands.82 Indeed, although the New Federalism revival promotes a casual understanding of the Tenth Amendment entitlement as one against
federal commandeering of state power,83 the better characteri79. See, e.g., Zachary Coile, Rep. Speier Proposes National Speed Limit to Aid
Fuel Efficiency, S.F. CHRON., July 11, 2008, at A1 (discussing the 1974 law that
conditioned federal highway funds on states’ adoption of a fifty-five mph limit). A
contentious modern example is President Bush’s “No Child Left Behind” initiative, by which the U.S. Department of Education has effectively mandated national elementary school performance standards, for example, David Nash, Note,
Improving No Child Left Behind: Achieving Excellence and Equity in Partnership
with the States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 239, 253 (2002), even though public education is beyond Congress’s enumerated powers. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (noting that
the commerce power does not authorize Congress to mandate a national school
curriculum).
80. Ryan, supra note 2, at 519, 564 (discussing the Tenth Amendment’s dual
sovereignty directive); see supra notes 31–32.
81. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602 (invalidating federal civil remedies under the
Violence Against Women Act because the provision exceeded federal authority
under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
82. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162
(2001) (implying that the Army Corps of Engineers had exceeded federal authority
under the Commerce Clause in asserting Clean Water Act jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, but holding on statutory grounds to avoid reaching the constitutional issue). See also infra note 235 (detailing how the progenies of this decision
have spun the law of wetlands regulation into unworkable chaos).
83. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (observing that the
Tenth Amendment forbids the federal government to “issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems [or] command the States’ officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program”).
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zation—acknowledged even by the Court’s own New Federalism proponents—is that the Tenth Amendment creates these
very state and federal entitlements to reciprocal jurisdictional
zones. To this point, writing for the majority in New York v.
United States,84 Justice O’Connor explained:
In a case like these, involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are
mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a
power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.85

As noted above, in its commerce and spending-power jurisprudence, the Court has interpreted these reciprocal state entitlements as protected under a property rule enabling their
waiver in spending-power deals. In its Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court has allowed the states to trade on an
entitlement to sovereign immunity that it has described as an
essential attribute of state sovereignty.86 But in the seminal
case of its New Federalism Tenth Amendment jurisprudence,
the Court chose a very different alternative from among those
described in the Cathedral framework. In New York v. United
States, as detailed in Part II, the Court protected its vision of
mutually exclusive state and federal regulatory spheres under
an inalienability rule that prevents any kind of waiver, even as
it allows a parallel sort of waiver in spending-power cases.87

84. 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
85. Id. See also Ryan, supra note 2, at 554–55.
86. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)
(“A sovereign’s immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that
a State may consent to suit against it in federal court.”); supra note 73.
87. For the argument that the Supreme Court’s spending-power cases wrongly undermine the rest of its New Federalism jurisprudence, see Lynn A. Baker,
Federalism and the Spending Power from Dole to Birmingham Board of Education, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 205, 205–06 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006) (discussing how South Dakota v. Dole provides a loophole through which Congress
may continue to regulate the states beyond what is condoned in other areas of the
New Federalism jurisprudence); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting
Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a
Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 499–500 (2003);
Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Government, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 461 (2002).
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D. Skepticism and the Cathedral
Before advancing to the case, however, it is worth confronting potential skepticism about whether Calabresi and Melamed’s private law bargaining analysis is truly applicable in
the remote context of constitutional federalism. This Article
proceeds in the firm belief that there is much to be gained from
intradisciplinary exchange between one area of legal thought
and another—even when there are rough edges to the enterprise—because it can illuminate old problems with the clarity
of a new vantage point, and unpack seemingly daunting new
problems with the benefit of proven conceptual tools. Even so,
are the differences between private and state-federal bargaining so raw that the Cathedral framework simply cannot be
made to fit? Analysis suggests otherwise. In fact, the dynamics of state-federal bargaining approximate marketplace bargaining even more closely than other forms of negotiation in
which government is a party. Moreover, the uncertainties that
pervade intergovernmental bargaining indicate that it suffers
even more acutely from the very private law bargaining problems that Calabresi and Melamed urge are best resolved by the
use of property and liability rules.88
Political bargaining, involving the authoritative allocation
of scarce resources, is often distinguished from economic bargaining, which involves the price-regulated allocation of scarce
resources.89 Political bargaining becomes necessary where
high transaction costs prevent market efficient bargaining,
leading to the use of sovereign authority. Similar problems relating to collective action and “signaling” (by which parties
communicate leverage, proposals, and concessions) occur in

88. For good primers on bargaining theory in general and as applied to governments, see generally GIDEON DORON & ITAI SENED, POLITICAL BARGAINING:
THEORY, PRACTICE, & PROCESS (2001); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979); David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599
(2000). See also Benjamin L. Snowden, Note, Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty: Understanding the Failure of the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 134 (2005) (detailing the rise and fall of the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact between Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, and the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact between Alabama
and Georgia). Snowden traces the seven-year history of the compacts from signing to breakdown, using the lens of bargaining theory to explore the legal and political issues that complicate negotiations engaging multiple sovereigns. Id.
89. DORON & SENED, supra note 88, at 7.
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both private and political bargaining, except that they are exacerbated in political bargaining, which generally involves a
greater variety of interests and players.90 Signaling becomes
more complex—even baroque—in the context of political bargaining.91 Compared with private parties, government actors
encounter more difficulty identifying the full scope of their own
interests at stake in the bargaining, because their constituents’
interests often conflict.92 They may even encounter greater difficulty understanding the interests of the other parties to the
negotiation, due to the public participation and open meeting
requirements that often accompany governmental negotiating.93 The stress added to political bargaining by these factors
only exacerbates the usual collective-action bargaining hurdles
that motivated the original Cathedral analysis.
State-federal political bargaining may be even more like
private economic bargaining than the more conventional political bargaining between participants in the same pool of sovereign authority. Where sovereign authority is truly divided (as
between federal and state government), rather than nested (as
between state and municipal governments), intergovernmental
negotiation will be more like price-regulated private bargaining, because neither side can compel the other to perform
against its will.94 The likeness becomes less clear in contexts
where one side commands most of the negotiating leverage (if,
for example, the regulatory target implicates clearly enumerated federal power and state authority has been all but field
preempted), but the analogy is strongest in the gray area of interjurisdictional concern that is the subject of this inquiry,
where sovereign authority is divided and yet both kinds are necessary to effectively regulate. Even where power disparities

90. See Snowden, supra note 88, at 179–80.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., id. at 176–77.
93. For example, in Snowden’s account, initial meetings to discuss the proposed compacts included “as many as 50 to 150 stakeholder groups or representatives,” reducing negotiation to “statement[s] of positions” rather than the more
nuanced information exchange preferred by bargaining theory. Id. at 179–80 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Interview by Joshua Azriel with Bob Kerr, Dir., Pollution Prevention Assistance Div., Ga. Dep’t of
Natural Res. (June 1999), available at http://www.wuftfm.org/rivers/ikerr.html).
94. This is true, at the very least, in a properly functioning market for bargaining. Where one side holds constitutional authority to regulate the other, as
Congress may require state compliance with legislation enacted under the postCivil War amendments, then the relationship is not one of bargaining but of legitimate constitutional compulsion.
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exist between the parties (and, to be sure, the federal government is not always the more powerful party),95 this reflects the
inherent inequalities of bargaining power that pervade private
bargaining. For example, Professor Roderick Hill has argued
that states behave “exactly like private firms” in negotiating
federal-state partnerships under the spending power.96
As do all negotiations, state-federal bargaining takes place
“in the shadow of the law,”97 but uncertainty regarding that
special legal context poses the biggest obstacle to efficient bargaining. The primary source of uncertainty, especially in the
interjurisdictional gray area, is the substantive question of who
actually holds which jurisdictional entitlement.98 But infrastructural uncertainties also pervade the law of intergovernmental bargaining—for instance, and especially in the federalism context, whether or not a given entitlement is even a
legitimate medium of exchange (as the anti-commandeering
entitlement currently is not). Similarly, parties negotiate with
an eye toward their best alternative to the negotiated agreement,99 but uncertainty about the reach of judicial or congressional intervention after the negotiation concludes can undermine the parties’ efforts to understand their true alternatives,
further compromising bargaining efficiency.100
To facilitate more efficient intergovernmental bargaining,
then, the single most important ex ante adjustment would be to
reduce the legal uncertainties that attend it through the articulation of clearer bargaining rules. Some uncertainty will always pervade political bargaining, due to the practical difficul95. As in all negotiations, leverage accrues to the party who loses the least
from reaching no deal. The federal government would likely be the bigger loser
were the states to withdraw from many cooperative federalism enterprises, as it
would then have to find ways to provide the needed regulatory services entirely on
its own, without the substantial assets of local government infrastructure. Cf.
Hills, supra note 29, at 817 (asserting that the “federal government should purchase [state and local] services through a voluntary intergovernmental agreement”).
96. Id. at 870 (but also arguing that the anti-commandeering rule provides an
important constraint on spending-power bargaining).
97. Cf. Mnookin & Kornhausert, supra note 88, at 950.
98. For example, in Snowden’s River Basin Compact example, uncertainty
regarding the extent of federal claims on the basin ultimately undermined the
success of the entire negotiation. Snowden, supra note 88, at 184.
99. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 100 (1991).
100. For example, Snowden shows how uncertainties regarding the potential
for congressional apportionment and the unlikely prospect of judicial intervention
helped undermine the River Basin Compact negotiations. Snowden, supra note
88, at 188.
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ties associated with public accountability and open meetings,
multiple stakeholders and conflicting constituent interests, and
some level of interjurisdictional competition. Yet even if the
substantive aspect of political bargaining remains confusing,
this Article contends that the Court could improve the overall
state-federal bargaining enterprise by clarifying the infrastructure—the procedural rules that help parties understand the
available media of exchange and their best alternatives to
agreement. New York v. United States arguably does this by
articulating an inalienability rule that forbids one form of bargaining altogether. However, Calabresi and Melamed argue
that bargaining-related uncertainties—especially uncertainty
about whether the initial allocation of entitlements was correct—counsels against inalienability rules.101 As proposed in
Part III, and in contrast to the New York rule, enabling freely
consensual bargaining over the anti-commandeering entitlement would facilitate interjurisdictional progress in exactly the
troubling case of uncertainty about the initial jurisdictional allocation. But first, we explore the history, architecture, and
consequences of the New York rule itself.
II. INALIENABILITY AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT: THE NEW
YORK RULE
In 1992, New York v. United States inaugurated the Supreme Court’s New Federalism era, setting forth the Tenth
Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine in a decision that
invalidated parts of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act Amendments of 1985.102 The most forceful component of
the Act’s penalty structure was held unconstitutional for commandeering state legislative authority, even though the states
had collaboratively crafted the law and lobbied Congress for its
passage over a competing proposal that would have preempted
them entirely by shifting oversight to federal regulators.103
The history of the New York saga foreshadows the difficulties
101. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1120.
102. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j
(2006)).
103. E.g., Neil Siegel, Commandeering and its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1660–64 (2006) (arguing that in thwarting the
state-based solution, the Court’s decision in New York was ultimately more destructive to state sovereignty interests than would have been a decision to uphold
the take-title provision).
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that the inalienability of the New York rule has since perpetuated. This Part reviews that history, analyzes the inalienability rule created by the Court’s decision, and describes the
chaotic aftermath that has again prompted congressional attention to the problem of safe and equitable disposal of radioactive waste. Finally, it explores the special challenges that
Tenth Amendment inalienability creates for intergovernmental
responses to problems that implicate both state and federal
jurisdiction.
A.

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act and the New
York decision involved a constitutional crisis over the disposal
of radioactive waste.104 As the Supreme Court explained,
commercially and scientifically produced radioactive waste is
both dangerous and ubiquitous:
Radioactive material is present in luminous watch dials,
smoke alarms, measurement devices, medical fluids, research materials, and the protective gear and construction
materials used by workers at nuclear power plants. Low
level radioactive waste is generated by the Government, by
hospitals, by research institutions, and by various industries. The waste must be isolated from humans for long periods of time, often for hundreds of years. Millions of cubic
feet of low level radioactive waste must be disposed of each
year.105

104. Generated from medical, scientific, and commercial applications, these
low-level radioactive waste products include debris, rubble, soils, paper, liquid,
metals, and clothing that have been exposed to radioactivity, and sealed radiological sources that are no longer useful. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO07-221, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT: APPROACHES USED BY
FOREIGN COUNTRIES MAY PROVIDE USEFUL LESSONS FOR MANAGING U.S.
RADIOACTIVE WASTE 1 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07
221.pdf. High-level radioactive waste, such as spent nuclear reactor fuel or weapons-grade material, is dealt with separately, though just as controversially, as it
is slated for burial beneath Yucca Mountain in Nevada. See Chris Rizo, NRC Rejects Nevada AG’s Yucca Mountain Complaint, LEGAL NEWSLINE, Aug. 22, 2008,
http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/215102-nrc-rejects-nevada-ags-yuccamountain-complaint (noting that 70 percent of Nevadans oppose the Yucca Mountain project, and describing efforts to fight it).
105. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149–50 (1992).
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Most Americans, it appears, prefer not to live near radioactive waste disposal facilities,106 and so the increasing use of
commercial technologies involving radioactive materials over
the 1970s and 1980s was not matched by an increase in disposal facilities to deal with their waste products. By 1979, after
half the nation’s disposal sites had either filled up or closed for
water management problems, only three low-level radioactive
waste facilities remained in the United States to handle the entire nation’s waste: the Beatty site in Nevada, the Hanford site
in Washington, and the Barnwell site in South Carolina.107
Nationwide, all waste that could not be stored safely at its site
of generation was trucked to one of these three facilities, frustrating the citizens of Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina, who resented bearing the burden of risk for the entire nation’s low-level radioactive waste stream.108
The states with disposal facilities (the “sited states”) faced
a dilemma. They could not simply close their borders to interstate shipments of waste and continue to site in-state produced
waste without running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause,
which forbids the states from discriminating against interstate
commerce.109 For constitutional purposes, shipments by paying customers for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste
created in other states represent a stream of interstate commerce otherwise indistinguishable from the preferred in-state
shipments. Accordingly, the sited states had two options: they
106. Id. at 182 (“Most citizens recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal
sites, but few want sites near their homes.”).
107. Id. at 150.
108. Audeen W. Fentiman, Tamara L. Leyerle & Ronald J. Veley, Factsheet:
Legislation Governing Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste, Ohio State University RER-60, http://ohioline.osu.edu/rer-fact/rer_60.html (last visited Aug. 29,
2009) (“In 1979 the governors of Nevada and Washington believed that they
should not have to bear forever the burden of low-level radioactive waste disposal
for the entire country . . . .”).
109. For example, the state of Washington tried to close its borders to out-ofstate shipments of nuclear waste in 1981, but failed when a federal court determined that to do so would violate the dormant commerce clause and the Supremacy Clause. Associated Press, State’s Nuclear Waste Ban Is Ruled Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1981, at 6, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/full
page.html?res=9503E6D91138F934A15755C0A967948260 (quoting Judge McNichols’s statement that the proposed ban was “unenforceable because it violates
both the supremacy and the commerce clause”); see also S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex
rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767–68 (1945) (explaining the rationale behind the
dormant commerce clause); Eby-Brown Co. v. Wis. Dep’t of Agric., 295 F.3d 749,
756 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The so-called ‘dormant commerce clause’ prohibits the various states from discriminating against or burdening items in the interstate
stream of commerce.”).
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could trigger a constitutional standoff to make their point (but
likely lose in court), or they could simply close their facilities
down completely, forcing the rest of the nation out of its collective stupor and into action regarding the radioactive waste capacity crisis.
One by one, they chose the latter option. In 1979, the Governor of Nevada closed the Beatty site after a leak was found in
a shipment of radioactive sludge delivered by truck; he pledged
not to allow it to reopen until he could be assured that the
packaging and transportation systems were “foolproof.”110
Shortly thereafter, Washington temporarily closed the Hanford
facility, leaving South Carolina’s Barnwell site as the only
available disposal facility in the country.111 This prompted
South Carolina’s own threat of closure, and the prospect of no
disposal capacity finally jump-started a national political conversation to resolve the inequities faced by the sited states
while protecting the public from unsafe exposure to harmful
radioactive waste products.112
To accomplish these objectives, Congress considered mandating a national regulatory program that would preempt state
decision making.113 However, the states negotiated an alternative proposal through the National Governors Association and
lobbied hard for Congress to adopt what came to be known as
the “state-based” solution.114 Underscored by the general policy that each state should be responsible for its own waste,115
110. See Nevada A-Dump Closed, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., July 13,
1979, at 519. After reopening and closing several times, Nevada closed the site
permanently in 1992. See Richard R. Zuercher, Nevada Accord Closes Beatty
LLW Facility Permanently, NUCLEONICS WK., Nov. 11, 1993, at 6; see also Squeeze
on Wastes, CHEMICAL WK., Apr. 12, 1978, at 21 (demonstrating the tense relations
between Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina over site closures).
111. New York, 505 U.S. at 150.
112. See id. at 151; see also Thomas O’Toole, President Seeking Permanent
Sites to Store Atomic Waste, Spent Fuel, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1980, at A1 (discussing the various sites that the federal government considered purchasing for
waste disposal as the South Carolina facility became harder to use).
113. New York, 505 U.S. at 192 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
114. Id.; see also id. at 189–90 (“To read the Court’s version of events, one
would think that Congress was the sole proponent of a solution to the Nation’s
low-level radioactive waste problem. Not so. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act of 1980 (“1980 Act”), and its amendatory 1985 Act, resulted from the
efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of remedies to the waste problem. They sought not federal pre-emption or intervention, but rather congressional sanction of interstate compromises they had reached.” (citations omitted)).
115. See id. at 190–91 (“In May 1980, the State Planning Council on Radioactive Waste Management submitted the following unanimous recommendation to
President Carter: ‘The national policy of the United States on low-level radioac-
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the states’ regional approach embodied a compromise between
the sited states (frustrated at bearing more than their fair
share of the nation’s toxic waste) and the unsited states (desperate for more time to prepare for the point at which they
would no longer be able to use the sited states’ facilities).116
Under this approach, states would be responsible for disposing
of their own waste, either alone or within regional interstate
compacts formed for the purpose of low-level radioactive waste
disposal.117 Each compact would choose a state to host the
compact’s disposal facility for a designated period, or otherwise
provide for waste disposal, as by contractual arrangement with
another compact for use of their facility.118 After a reasonable
period in which unsited states could build new disposal facilities, the sited states would be authorized in 1986 to close their
borders to interstate shipments of waste if they chose, or to
admit waste generated only from within their own regional
compacts.119
The plan would alleviate the unfair burden on the sited
states while protecting all Americans from the hazards associated with the cross-country transportation of low-level radioactive waste on public highways. However, the states could
not implement the plan completely on their own; they needed
Congress’s formal blessing to head off the dormant Commerce
Clause problem otherwise created by the controls on interstate
waste shipments after the 1986 deadline.120 In acknowledgment of the states’ hard-fought consensus, Congress unanimously adopted the state-based approach in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (“the Act”).121

tive waste shall be that every State is responsible for the disposal of the low-level
radioactive waste generated by nondefense related activities within its boundaries
and that States are authorized to enter into interstate compacts, as necessary, for
the purpose of carrying out this responsibility.’ This recommendation was
adopted by the National Governors’ Association a few months later.” (citations
omitted)).
116. Id. at 181 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Act embodies a bargain among the
sited and unsited States . . . .”).
117. Id. at 150–51.
118. Id. at 151–52; Fentiman, Leyerle & Veley, supra note 108.
119. New York, 505 U.S. at 151.
120. Id. (“The 1980 Act authorized States to enter into regional compacts that,
once ratified by Congress, would have the authority beginning in 1986 to restrict
the use of their disposal facilities to waste generated within member States.”).
121. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347
(1980) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021d (2006)).
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Despite such national consensus before its passage into
law, the plan was plagued by widespread noncompliance.122
The initial Act was toothless;123 Congress had honored the
states’ request that it include no federal penalties for violations
in the first few years, giving the states time to evaluate how
best to perfect their plans without federal interference.124
However, this deference did not serve the Act’s goal of rapid
progress toward the creation of additional disposal capacity, as
no new facilities had been built even by 1985.125 As the sited
and unsited states had negotiated, the Act permitted the sited
states to refuse out-of-state shipments beginning in 1986, a
fast-approaching deadline that was now certain to leave many
states without any means of disposing of this hazardous
waste.126 The looming crisis was reminiscent of that which had
prompted Congress to act in the first place: things seemed as
they had in 1979 when the sited states first threatened to close
their facilities, except that now they could do so without violating the dormant Commerce Clause.
Anxious to forestall a top-down federal solution, the states
returned to the negotiating table to hammer out a new proposal, which the National Governors Association persuaded Congress to pass as the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
Amendments of 1985.127 The new compromise extended the
122. See New York, 505 U.S. at 151.
123. Id. (“The 1980 Act included no penalties for States that failed to participate in this plan.”).
124. Id. at 191–92 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White quoted
from the Governors’ Task Force’s recommendation to Congress that it:
defer consideration of sanctions to compel the establishment of new disposal sites until at least two years after the enactment of compact consent legislation. States are already confronting the diminishing capacity
of present sites and an unequivocal political warning from those states’
Governors. If at the end of the two-year period states have not responded effectively, or if problems still exist, stronger federal action may be
necessary. But until that time, Congress should confine its role to removing obstacles and allow the states a reasonable chance to solve the
problem themselves.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 195 (“Congress could have
pre-empted the field by directly regulating the disposal of this waste pursuant to
its powers under the Commerce and Spending Clauses, but instead it unanimously assented to the States’ request for congressional ratification of agreements to
which they had acceded.”).
125. Id. at 151 (majority opinion).
126. See supra notes 119–20.
127. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j
(2006)); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 151 (acknowledging the role of the Nation-
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deadline by which unsited states could continue to ship waste
to sited states until 1992, but included harsher penalties for
non-compliance with a timetable of regulatory milestones requiring states to take specific steps toward the ultimate goal of
disposal self-sufficiency.128
Noncompliant states would still lose access to the sited
states’ disposal facilities after the six-year extension, but states
that failed to meet milestones over the intervening years could
also be forced to pay steep surcharges for access to existing disposal facilities in increasing increments over time, and denied
certain access even before the 1992 final deadline.129 One
quarter of the surcharges levied by the sited state facilities
would be collected and redistributed by the Secretary of Energy
to states that did meet the required milestones.130
Finally, the most severe penalty under the new plan, and
that most expected to motivate compliance, was the “take-title”
penalty, by which a state that had not met the terms of the Act
by 1996 would be held to “take title” to any low-level radioactive waste produced within its borders at the request of the
waste’s producers.131
The take-title provision essentially
meant that a state would assume legal liability for any damage
associated with low-level radioactive waste produced within its
borders for which it had not made disposal arrangements, either by building its own facility or by gaining access to a site
with sufficient capacity through membership in a willing regional compact. As a quid pro quo for the six-year reprieve that
the sited states were granting, the unsited states were thus
promising to make genuine progress toward self-sufficiency or
face real and dire consequences.

al Governors Association in preparing the terms of the law). Hereafter, references
to “the Act” refer to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act as amended in
1985.
128. New York, 505 U.S. at 151–53. Among these milestones: by 1986, each
state was to have ratified legislation in which it either joined a regional compact
or indicated an intent to develop a disposal facility within the state; by 1988, each
unsited compact was to have identified the state in which its facility would be located, and each compact or stand-alone state was to have developed a siting plan
for the new facility; by 1990, each state or compact was to have filed a complete
application for a license to operate the disposal facility (or certified that the state
would be able to dispose of all in-state generated waste after 1992). Id. at 152–53.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 152.
131. Id. at 153–54.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1350008

2010]

FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL

B.

35

New York State’s Challenge

These Amendments might have achieved the needed ratio
of carrot to stick, but the Tenth Amendment challenge that
would follow obviated any such accomplishment.
Over the following seven years, Congress approved nine
regional compacts encompassing forty-two states, three of
which included the sited states of South Carolina, Washington,
and Nevada.132 The six unsited compacts and four of the unaffiliated states met the first few milestones required under the
Amended Act, among them New York State—one of the largest
state producers of low-level radioactive waste in the nation.133
Anxious for prolonged access to existing facilities until it could
make other arrangements, New York had supported both the
state-based plan that the National Governors Association initially brought to Congress and the secondary compromise in
the penalty-bearing Amendments, actively lobbying for their
passage into federal law.134 With so much in-state waste production, New York especially benefited from the additional
twelve years of access under the law, and it made good faith efforts to build its own facility during that time.135 Although it
enacted legislation providing for the siting and financing of a
facility and identified five potential locations in Allegany and
Cortland counties, the surrounding communities each strenuously objected to the construction of a radioactive waste disposal site in their vicinity.136
With the 1992 deadline fast approaching and no contingency for disposing of the waste that could soon be refused by
the sited states, New York and its two counties sued to overturn the Act on various grounds, including violation of their
rights under the due process clause, the Tenth Amendment,
the Eleventh Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause.137 After
losing at the district and appellate court levels, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to hear New York on its Tenth
Amendment and Guaranty Clause issues.138 The Court was interested in New York’s claim that the Act’s penalty structure
commandeered its retained reservoir of state sovereign author132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 180–81.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ity, most dramatically through the take-title provision.139 New
York argued that under the Tenth Amendment, Congress could
neither force a state to build a radioactive waste disposal facility, nor compel it to assume liability for the waste of in-state
producers, and so the false choice required under the Act rendered it an unenforceable act of federal coercion.140
The sited states intervened as defendants in New York’s
suit.141 They agreed with the position of the United States that
the Act did not violate the Tenth Amendment, but added that
whether or not some other state could successfully object to the
Act on these grounds, New York—of all states—could hardly
state a Tenth Amendment claim of coercion when it had so
clearly consented to the very terms it now challenged.142 Even
if, arguendo, the Act really interfered with a state’s Tenth
Amendment rights in the abstract, they argued, New York had
waived the relevant entitlement, not only through its participation in the National Governors Association process but by its
independent efforts to get the Act and Amendment passed into
federal law.143 As Justice White wrote in dissent:
Id. at 174–77.
See id. at 175–76.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 180–81. As Justice O’Connor wrote:
The sited state respondents focus their attention on the process by
which the Act was formulated. They correctly observe that public officials representing the State of New York lent their support to the Act’s
enactment. A Deputy Commissioner of the State’s Energy Office testified in favor of the Act. Senator Moynihan of New York spoke in support
of the Act on the floor of the Senate. Respondents note that the Act embodies a bargain among the sited and unsited States, a compromise to
which New York was a willing participant and from which New York has
reaped much benefit. Respondents then pose what appears at first to be
a troubling question: How can a federal statute be found an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty when state officials consented to
the statute’s enactment?
Id. (citations omitted).
143. Id. Justice White wrote separately to convey his understanding of New
York’s waiver:
In my view, New York’s actions subsequent to enactment of the 1980
and 1985 Acts fairly indicate its approval of the interstate agreement
process embodied in those laws within the meaning of Art. 1, §10, cl. 3, of
the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement of Compact with another
State.” First, the States—including New York—worked through their
Governors to petition Congress for the 1980 and 1985 Acts. . . . Second,
New York acted in compliance with the requisites of both statutes in key
respects, thus signifying its assent to the agreement achieved among the
States as codified in these laws. After enactment of the 1980 Act and
139.
140.
141.
142.
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As I have attempted to demonstrate, these statutes are best
understood as the products of collective state action, rather
than as impositions placed on States by the Federal Government. . . . Indeed, in 1985, as the January 1, 1986, deadline crisis approached and Congress considered the 1985
legislation that is the subject of this lawsuit, the Deputy
Commissioner for Policy and Planning of the New York
State Energy Office testified before Congress that “New
York State supports the efforts of Mr. Udall and the members of this Subcommittee to resolve the current impasse
over Congressional consent to the proposed LLRW compacts
and provide interim access for states and regions without
sites. New York State has been participating with the National Governors’ Association and the other large states and
compact commissions in an effort to further refine the recommended approach in HR 1083 and reach a consensus between all groups.”
Based on the assumption that “other states will [not]
continue indefinitely to provide access to facilities adequate
for the permanent disposal of low-level radioactive waste
generated in New York,” the state legislature enacted a law
providing for a waste disposal facility to be sited in the
State. . . . [Justice White described New York’s compliance
with various provisions of the Act]. As it was undertaking
these initial steps to honor the interstate compromise embodied in the 1985 Act, New York continued to take full advantage of the import concession made by the sited States,
by exporting its low-level radioactive waste for the full 7year extension period provided in the 1985 Act. By gaining
these benefits and complying with certain of the Act’s 1985
deadlines, therefore, New York fairly evidenced its acceptance of the federal-state arrangement—including the take
title provision.144

pursuant to its provision in § 4(a)(2), 94 Stat. 3348, New York entered
into compact negotiations with several other northeastern States before
withdrawing from them to “go it alone.”
Id. at 196 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
144. Id. at 196–98 (citations omitted). Justice White further cited the rule in
Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951), in which the Court denied a claim by West Virginia that it did not have the constitutional authority to enter into the compact it
had already joined:
Estoppel is not often to be invoked against a government. But West Virginia assumed a contractual obligation with equals by permission of
another government that is sovereign in the field. After Congress and
sister States had been induced to alter their positions and bind themselves to terms of a covenant, West Virginia should be estopped from repudiating her act.
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The sited states claimed that New York could not make out a
commandeering challenge after specifically asking to be bound
by the terms of a legislative bargain, one in which it had participated just long enough to reap the intended benefits of twelve
additional years of access to the sited states’ facilities. Surely,
they urged, New York’s actions seeking federal ratification of
the interstate deal it had helped negotiate should vitiate a later
claim that Congress had violated its state sovereignty.
To be sure, there were compelling arguments on both sides
of the debate as to whether New York’s actions leading up to
the passage of the challenged provisions should have estopped
its subsequent Tenth Amendment challenge. Its enthusiastic
support for federal passage of the Act and its Amendments certainly made New York seem less like the victim of federal coercion and more like an opportunistic litigant, one seeking any
possible legal foothold before a Court itching to hold forth on
matters of federalism. Similarly, waiver might be discernable
from its manifested intent to abide by the terms of the Act until
the time of its challenge—at least insofar as to take full advantage of the period of extended access.145
On the other hand, Tenth Amendment waiver had never
previously been addressed by the Court, so whether New York’s
action did or did not constitute waiver would have been a question of first impression. If Tenth Amendment waiver is comparable to a state’s waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit, then New York’s actions—though suggestive and
even self-serving—were still probably too indirect to have qualified as waiver. Eleventh Amendment waiver must be made
explicitly; there is no such thing as “implied” or “constructive”
Eleventh Amendment waiver.146 By these standards, even if
the National Governors Association could be held to have spoken for New York, its recommendation to Congress did not
have the force of a binding agreement by the states, it was not
formally consented to by the state legislatures, and it certainly
fell short of an explicit waiver of protected constitutional
Id. at 199 (emphasis omitted) (citing Dyer, 341 U.S. at 34).
145. Id. at 196–98.
146. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 675–76 (1999) (explaining that its “stringent” test finds waiver of a
state’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity “if the State voluntarily invokes
our jurisdiction, or else if the State makes a clear declaration that it intends to
submit itself to our jurisdiction,” but not if a state is merely consenting to suits in
state courts or stating its intention to “sue and be sued” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1350008

2010]

FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL

39

rights. Neither could statements of support for the legislation
by higher-level New York officials be construed as express consent to waive a constitutional right. That New York took advantage of open disposal facilities also may not manifest a clear
intent to surrender its Tenth Amendment rights, at least if the
appropriate metric were the Eleventh Amendment model.147
In the end, the well-known outcome of the case is that New
York prevailed on its Tenth Amendment claim with regard to
the take-title penalty, the penalty was stricken, and legal history was made as the New Federalism’s Tenth Amendment
anti-commandeering doctrine was born.148 The Court was clear
that although Congress could preempt state authority to directly regulate the interstate market for low-level radioactive
waste disposal, and though it can wield the spending power to
persuade states to voluntarily accede to a federal regulatory
program, “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”149 In
other words, the Tenth Amendment creates an entitlement to
the states for a zone of federal noninterference, which, inter
alia, forbids the federal government from using (or “commandeering”) state government as an apparatus within a national
regulatory program.
C.

The New York v. United States Inalienability Rule

For the purposes of our inquiry here, however, the significant part of the decision is not the anti-commandeering rule itself, but how the Court dealt with the question of waiver. Inadvertently or otherwise, it did so by protecting the new anticommandeering rule with a Cathedral inalienability rule. This
section describes how the decision made the anticommandeering entitlement both explicitly inalienable by
elected officials and implicitly inalienable by any other means,
and differentiates the property rule that would apply to spending-power bargaining over related jurisdictional trades.
1.

Anti-commandeering Inalienability

Rather than deciding, as well it might have, that New
York’s actions simply did not rise to the needed level for waiv147.
148.
149.

See New York, 505 U.S. at 183.
Id. at 187–88.
Id. at 188.
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ing the Tenth Amendment entitlement against federal commandeering, the Court decided that the entire waiver question
was moot. There was no need to decide whether New York’s
actions met the criteria for waiver because, simply put, there is
no such waiver in the Tenth Amendment context. Writing for
the majority, Justice O’Connor explained that a state may not
waive its Tenth Amendment entitlement because the Tenth
Amendment protects not the state itself but the interest its individual citizens hold in state sovereignty:
The sited state respondents focus their attention on the
process by which the Act was formulated. They correctly
observe that public officials representing the State of New
York lent their support to the Act’s enactment. . . . Respondents note that the Act embodies a bargain among the sited
and unsited States, a compromise to which New York was a
willing participant and from which New York has reaped
much benefit. Respondents then pose what appears at first
to be a troubling question: How can a federal statute be
found an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty
when state officials consented to the statute’s enactment?
The answer follows from an understanding of the fundamental purpose served by our Government’s federal
structure. The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of
the public officials governing the States. To the contrary,
the Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals. State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: “Rather, federalism
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” . . .
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the
States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan
cannot be ratified by the “consent” of state officials.150

By this reasoning, state actors can never waive the Tenth
Amendment entitlement against federal commandeering. Even
if the New York state legislature had explicitly signaled its intent to waive any Tenth Amendment objections to the requirements of this or any other federal law, said the Court, it would
150. Id. at 180–82 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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have no legal consequence, because elected officials may not
waive a constitutional entitlement intended to protect individual citizens. For the purposes of legislative and executive action, then, the Tenth Amendment entitlement is inalienable as
a matter of constitutional law.
Moreover, decision (or game) theory indicates that it would
be inalienable even by the citizens supposedly empowered by
the Court’s rationale except by legislative or executive action
(or its functional equivalent). Whether a state’s citizens could
directly waive the entitlement was not addressed by the decision, but even if the majority had intended this odd contingency, any number of collective-action problems make the needed
universal consensus both theoretically and pragmatically impossible.151 In reasoning that the entitlement cannot be
waived by state officials because it exists to protect individual
citizens, the Court essentially analogizes to others in the Bill of
Rights that protect individuals and cannot be waived by elected
representatives or majority vote, such as the right to jury trial
or the right against unreasonable searches (which are, after all,
countermajoritarian by design). But these other constitutional
rights protect a waivable autonomy that can only inhere in
separate individuals, while the Tenth Amendment protects
something singular and external in which all citizens hold
equal interests collectively.152
For citizens to waive their collectively held Tenth Amendment entitlement would thus require universal assent by each
individually consenting citizen, but scholars of collective action
agree that universal consensus in so large a group is all but
impossible—not only due to inevitable policy dissensus among
statewide electorates,153 but also to the classic collective-action
problem of holdout, where a minority wields its veto power to
151. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971).
152. Indeed, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790–91 (2008)
(invalidating a gun control ordinance banning handguns in the home), the Court
clarified its understanding that the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of sovereign
authority to “the people” refers to them only in their corporate capacity, as the collective body that forms the citizenry of a government: “the term unambiguously
refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”
153. Even setting aside the holdout problem, members of a large group with
common interest (such as a state) will almost never unanimously agree on the
best way to further the group’s interest. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 151, at 8
(explaining this collective-action problem and noting the example of a labor union,
where “the members . . . have a common interest in higher wages, but at the same
time each worker has a unique interest in his personal income”).
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“hold out” for special treatment by a majority anxious for their
agreement.154 A single naysayer could cancel the will of all
other voters, creating overwhelming incentives for the obstacles that game theory predicts in such environments (and
for which liability rules are often used to defuse),155 foreclosing
the possibility that citizens could ever reach the universal
agreement needed to alienate.156 Similarly, the collective154. See Epstein, supra note 23, at 1366–67 (discussing holdout in the real estate context and observing that “[i]f a holdout is adamant, no private party can
force him to sell the land in question at any price”).
155. For example, the law of eminent domain employs a liability rule for exactly this purpose. See, e.g., W.A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND POLITICS 68 (1995) (“Holdouts are endemic in public projects . . . . Preventing
time-consuming strategic bargaining is an important justification for eminent
domain.”).
Holdouts can also stall negotiations involving property sales, business
mergers, and telecommunications. See, e.g., SIMON M. LORNE & JOY MARLENE
BRYAN, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED
TRANSACTIONS § 9:39 (2005) (“In NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke, [998 F.2d 1416
(8th Cir. 1993)], a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court decision and held that the National Bank Act did not prohibit a ‘freeze out’ merger
in which minority shareholders were forced to accept cash for their stock in a national bank.”); see also NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1422–23 (“Disallowing freeze out mergers would mean that minority shareholders could hold up an efficient consolidation or merger transaction by refusing to give their consent . . . .”); Dale Hatfield
& Philip J. Weiser, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property
Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 605 (2008) (“If all entrants in the telecommunications service or equipment manufacturing markets could be ‘held up’ from
deploying a new service or product until the incumbent voluntarily agreed to afford it access and interconnection to its network, those entrants would be placed
at a formidable and likely insurmountable disadvantage.”).
Of note, the buyout of the tiny, polluted town of Cheshire, Ohio provides
at least one documented example of a multiparty transaction that overcame the
holdout obstacle. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 91
(2004). Still, with a population of only 221 people, the Cheshire example promises
little for universal consensus at the state level, where populations range from
Wyoming’s 522,000 to California’s 36,000,000. See U.S. Census Bureau, Annual
Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and
Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/
NST-ann-est.html (select “Excel” under “Formats Available”) (last visited Aug. 30,
2009).
156. The history of statewide referendums further demonstrate that they are
unlikely to yield unanimity because voters are predictably unpredictable and often vote for reasons seemingly unrelated to the objectives of the proposition. Cf.
JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 143 (2004) (discussing how even seemingly
“crazy” proposals can attract surprising levels of support among statewide electorates); Buck Wolf, Donald Duck’s a Big Bird in Politics, ABC NEWS, http://abc
news.go.com/Entertainment/WolfFiles/story?id=91051&page=1 (last visited Aug.
30, 2009) (noting that the Donald Duck Party has received enough write-in votes
to be Sweden’s ninth-most-popular political organization). There have been some
unanimous or nearly unanimous group decisions in American history, but none on

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1350008

2010]

FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL

43

action problem by which some individuals “free ride” on the
contributions of others accounts, at least in part, for the chronic
problem of low voter turnout at elections: most Americans appreciate living in a democracy, but the large numbers who don’t
bother to vote on election day are effectively free-riding on the
efforts of those who do.
Even beyond the theoretical problems with achieving
statewide consensus are the very real pragmatic problems implied by the statewide referendum needed to accomplish it:
would it really be possible to hold an election or census that
would actually count the vote of each entitlement holder? The
history of modern elections and census-taking suggests (strongly) that the answer is no. Many presidential elections boast
participation rates of barely half the electorate, and even
among those who do show up, volumes of votes are cast but not
counted for various reasons.157 If an individual’s entitlement is
so precious that it cannot be waived by her elected representatives, should we allow it to be waived by butterfly ballot?158
Meanwhile, the federal government’s acknowledgment that the
the scale of a statewide referendum. See, e.g., InfoUSA, Bureau of Int’l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Electoral Process, http://usinfo.org/enus/govern
ment/elections/electoralProcess.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) (noting that the
Electoral College “voted unanimously on only two occasions, both for George
Washington, for the terms beginning in 1789 and 1793”).
157. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (citing statistics showing that 2
percent of cast ballots fail to register a vote, either because the ballot remains
blank, is insufficiently marked, or marks two different candidates); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION
OF NOVEMBER 2000: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2002), http://www.cen
sus.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf (reporting that only 55 percent of the total voting-age population voted in the unusually well-attended 2000 presidential election
between candidates George W. Bush and Albert Gore). Indeed, not all citizens are
registered or even entitled to vote (for example, children, felons in some states,
and others that have not met various state requirements for voting), but the New
York decision clearly associates the entitlement with citizenship, not voting status.
158. Cf. Don Van Natta Jr., Gore Set to Fight Palm Beach Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2000, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/25/politics/25
PALM.html (noting that a basis for Gore’s challenge was “10,000 sworn affidavits
signed by residents ranging in age from 18 to 98, [many of whom] said they were
confused by the butterfly ballot’s design or were denied assistance or given wrong
instructions”). Electronic malfunction represents another threat. See John
Schwartz, Mostly Good Reviews for Electronic Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004,
at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/12/politics/12evote.html (reviewing the performance of electronic voting machines during the 2004 elections
and noting that “[i]n a few states, including Florida, some voters reported that
their selection of Senator John Kerry on touchscreens turned into a vote for President Bush, forcing them to restart the process so that their true votes could be
properly recorded”).
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census regularly misses millions of Americans (and disproportionately among them, the poor and politically disenfranchised)
led to a national debate about whether to supplement the 2000
Census’s raw enumeration with figures derived from statistical
sampling techniques.159 Referenda and census-taking are thus
flawed means by which to ensure the participation of each of a
state’s citizens, but how else would citizens collectively waive
their Tenth Amendment entitlement except by a vote or census
of some kind? If the entitlement is substantial enough to warrant inalienability by elected officials, wouldn’t the inevitable
underinclusiveness of a statewide plebiscite also pose a constitutional problem?
Moreover, if we were to settle for something other than a
perfect accounting of a universal consensus—for example, supermajority vote at a standard statewide referendum—then
that would raise questions about why majority-elected state officials could not just alienate the entitlement as a proxy for the
people’s will in the first place. Indeed, the New York majority
purported to protect citizens’ Tenth Amendment interests by
requiring state-federal cooperation to take place through conditional federal spending or full federal preemption because these
methods enable “the residents of the State [to] retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply,”160—
presumably by electing representatives who will enact their
policy preferences.
Yet this proposition is difficult to reconcile with its stated
rationale for anti-commandeering inalienability. If electing
representatives who reflect their policy preferences suffices to
express citizens’ will regarding their Tenth Amendment entitlement in spending-power contexts, why can’t the same
state-wide representatives act as rightful agents of their constituent entitlement-holders in bargaining with the federal gov159. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic & Barbara Vobejda, High Court Rejects Sampling
In Census, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at A1 (“In hopes of getting more accurate
population figures, the Census Bureau had wanted to combine the results of a
traditional head count with a statistical ‘sample’ . . . . [This was done] to get a
more accurate fix on the nation’s population at a time when increasingly larger
numbers of people do not speak English, are not part of stable families or move
frequently.”).
160. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). Justice O’Connor
explained: “If a State’s citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local
interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant. . . . Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the
people.” Id.
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ernment over the entitlement itself? How is one form of representation meaningfully different from the other? Both seem to
reflect the theory of representative democracy on which the republic is founded; it is not clear why the first way constitutionally protects citizens’ Tenth Amendment interests and the
second does not.
Sliced theoretically or pragmatically, then, the Tenth
Amendment entitlement described in New York was also rendered inalienable. The Court did not employ the vocabulary of
the Cathedral framework directly, so we cannot know what the
majority truly intended regarding direct alienability by citizens
(or more to the point, whether they thought it through at all).
However, forensic analysis of the decision suggests that the
majority intended a standard inalienability rule, binding
elected officials and citizens alike. Importantly, the Court supported its conclusion by likening constitutional federalism to
other structural constraints unavailable for renegotiation, like
the horizontal separation of powers between the three branches
of government.161 This suggests the majority’s view that Tenth
Amendment state sovereign authority is an intrinsically inalienable constitutional medium—as fixed an entitlement as
those protected by the non-delegation doctrine—regardless of
whether by state or by citizen.
2.

Spending-Power Alienability

But is this really so? Given the extent to which states regularly do waive such sovereign authority in spending-power
negotiations with Congress and interstate compacts with other
states, it is hard to understand how it could be without rejecting nearly a century of settled constitutional law.162 The Tenth
Amendment is the core expression of constitutional federalism—encapsulating the dual sovereignty directive that is its
defining feature—but federalism constraints have a less immutable quality than the horizontal separation of powers en161. Id. at 182 (“Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States,
therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the
‘consent’ of state officials. An analogy to the separation of powers among the
branches of the Federal Government clarifies this point. The Constitution’s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the
territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.”).
162. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing state authority yielded to other states in
interstate compacts).
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titlements,163 which have remained inalienable (at least in
theory164) even as the Court has allowed federalism entitlements to be traded on the open market in other contexts.
States routinely waive their Eleventh Amendment entitlement
to sovereign authority to private litigants,165 their Tenth
Amendment sovereign authority to other states in interstate
compacts,166 and their constitutionally protected jurisdictional
territory to the federal government in the commonplace statefederal bargaining via the spending power,167 which even New
York heralded as an available alternative to trading on the
Tenth Amendment entitlement.168 How can all these other instances of negotiated federalism constraints be permissible if
they are supposed to be as fiercely protected as the separation
of powers among the three branches?169
163. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) (discussing the separation of powers doctrine and noting that it “depends largely upon
common understanding of what activities are appropriate” to each branch).
164. The Court has not enforced the non-delegation doctrine protecting the horizontal separation of powers for more than sixty years, instead upholding all recent delegations to administrative agencies.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.10.1 (3d ed. 2006); see, e.g.,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (holding that the
EPA’s promulgation of ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act was
not a usurpation of legislative power).
165. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 613
(2002) (“This Court has established the general principle that a State’s voluntary
appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and has often cited with approval the cases embodying that principle.”
(citations omitted)); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 681 n.3 (1999).
166. See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger & Richard L. Masters, The Interstate Compact on Adult Offender Supervision: Using Old Tools to Solve New Problems, 9
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 71 (2003) (discussing how states use interstate compacts to work together on national issues while preserving autonomy); see also infra Part III.B.3 (refuting the distinction between the state sovereign authority
yielded to other states in state compacts and to the federal government in statefederal bargaining).
167. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 87, at 205–06 (discussing how South Dakota v.
Dole provides a loophole through which Congress may continue to regulate the
states beyond what is condoned in other areas of the New Federalism jurisprudence); Baker & Berman, supra note 87, at 499–500 (arguing that the Court’s decision in Dole allows Congress to pursue goals under the Spending Clause that it
otherwise could not); Siegel, supra note 103, at 1655–57 (arguing that the anticommandeering doctrine may not actually advance federalism values, since the
Court’s proposed alternative is that Congress engage states in spending-power
deals that compromise the same federalism values claimed in support of the anticommandeering doctrine).
168. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1992).
169. One might counter that the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering rule
protects federalism values of a different order than the Eleventh Amendment and
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Enabling alienation of the same state sovereign authority
in spending-power deals undermines the rationale for Tenth
Amendment inalienability, and at least one federalism scholar
suggests that the availability of state-federal bargaining under
the Spending Clause converts the entire anti-commandeering
infrastructure into a property-rule protected regime.170 Professor Roderick Hills has identified the New York entitlement as
protected under a property rule, correctly observing that it gets
stronger protection than it would under a liability rule because
the states may withhold their services from the federal government even if the federal government were to fully compensate them.171 However, his analysis considers only the two
choices—property or liability rule—missing the third potential
leg of the Cathedral stool. By contrast, Professor Ilya Somin
invokes Calabresi and Melamed to more precisely specify that
the anti-commandeering doctrine protects state autonomy “by
an ‘inalienability rule’ that prevents it from being violated even
through the voluntary agreement of the states themselves.”172
Regardless of semantics, the Court’s proposition that
needed interjurisdictional collaboration can always take place
through spending-power negotiations raises the fair question
whether the entitlement is really alienable after all. If the
same kind of state sovereign authority can be alienated by other means, then isn’t it at least waivable in some form, and isn’t
that enough? The answers, respectively, are yes and no. The
spending power enables one way in which states may waive sovereign authority, but the Cathedral framework appropriately
directs our attention not just to the undifferentiated pool of sovereign authority, but to the relevant entitlement—the particular slice of that state sovereign bologna—that becomes the subject of bargaining. The argument that the spending power
converts the New York inalienability rule into a property rule
spending power do, but the underlying values of federalism do not change depending on which constitutional design feature is protecting them. See Ryan, supra
note 2, at 602–06; Siegel, supra note 103, at 1660–68.
170. Hills, supra note 29, at 822–23 (arguing that the New York entitlement to
states to “withhold their own services and the services of state and local personnel
subject to their constitutional authority from the federal government” is “protected by a property rule”).
171. Id.
172. Somin, supra note 87, at 482; see also McGinnis & Somin, supra note 44,
at 94 n.14 (“[W]e do not believe that state and federal officials should be able to
bargain away or surrender their respective powers. . . . [T]he rules defining the
structure of federalism are inalienability rules rather than property or liability
rules.”).
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conflates the relevant entitlements, misses the important ways
in which commandeering bargaining can resolve collectiveaction problems that spending-power bargaining cannot, and
presumes that the dance of state-federal negotiation should always be within the control of the federal government.
The entitlement to a particular slice of sovereign authority
waived in spending-power deals is infrastructurally distinct
from the more specific anti-commandeering entitlement. First,
the state’s waived authority in spending-power deals may only
be purchased for cash, not traded for in-kind regulatory benefits as a waivable anti-commandeering entitlement might be.
This precludes an infinite variety of intergovernmental bargains that would trade waiver of a state’s anti-commandeering
entitlement to enable compensatory regulatory benefits—
benefits that could be justified in federalism terms and would
be otherwise unrealizable.173
In the New York example, the states collaborated to resolve
an interjurisdictional regulatory problem in a way that preserved state autonomy against preemption but required federal
ratification, which would have been a very difficult negotiation
to effect under the spending power. Assuming arguendo that
the New York defendants could prove waiver on their facts, the
states would have had to replace the straightforward anticommandeering waiver they offered Congress (effectively, “We
have come to an interstate agreement and need your help to
make it enforceable by binding us to our promises”) with an invitation to a conditional spending bargain that might look more
like: “We have come to an interstate agreement that needs your
help to become enforceable, so please do that for us and also
give us some money.” Would those bargains really look the
same to Congress? Perhaps Congress would prefer to just
preempt the field, which might not benefit the state sovereign
authority purportedly protected in this decision.
In addition, spending-power deals do not afford the tools
for negotiating around collective-action problems made available through the negotiated waiver of states’ anticommandeering entitlements. Again taking the New York facts
to illustrate, the state-based solution was designed to resolve a
demonstrated collective-action problem shown to require meaningful enforcement measures to bind states to the bargain

173. See Siegel, supra note 103 (describing how the anti-commandeering rule
limits state autonomy in derogation of federalism values).
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early on, when nobody yet knew who would benefit most or
least. By forging a federally enforceable agreement behind the
contract veil of ignorance, the states could create a meaningful
regulatory system free of fair-weather bargaining partners,
who might (as New York State ultimately did) free-ride on the
continued sacrifice of the sited states and then renege when it
becomes their turn to pay.174 In a spending-power deal, states
are free to join and leave the program as they see fit, simply by
accepting and then refusing funds. Although this freedom may
appear to advance the federalism value of local autonomy, that
value is ultimately undermined by the wisdom of the contract
law premise that we are most free when we can choose to be
bound by our own promises.175 State compacts uncoupled from
federal penalties suffer from the same defect because they are
so easy to disavow.176 After New York, no state can truly bind
itself to its promises, and all the other states know it.
Moreover, limiting state-federal bargaining to deals based
on conditional spending confers a leadership role on the federal
government at all times, again precluding the kind of novel
bargaining the states sought to effect in New York. It assumes
that Congress is the only party that would initiate intergovernmental bargaining, empowers federal actors in the negotiation by assigning them first-offer rights, and reduces the role
of the states to accepting or rejecting the terms of a financial
trade-off. Indeed, we should consider it significant that the
spending power has not been the chosen medium for bargaining in the intergovernmental negotiations that have encountered anti-commandeering challenges. What does that tell us
about the limits of conditional spending negotiations? The very
fact that the states and Congress all unanimously approved the
approach undone in New York and did not simply turn to a
spending-power arrangement thereafter suggests that there
are differences in the spending-power approach that differentiate the entitlements at issue, both substantively and for the
practical purposes in which they have arisen in government.

174. See infra Part III.B.3 (explaining why interstate compacts are hard to enforce absent external penalties, because states can simply withdraw when they no
longer wish to participate).
175. E.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 9–11, 14–16 (1981).
176. See infra Part III.B.3.
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D. The Aftermath: Radioactive Waste Disposal in
Interjurisdictional Limbo
Before exploring the legal implications of the Tenth
Amendment inalienability rule, it is worth reviewing the practical consequences for low-level radioactive waste disposal that
have followed. The ongoing gridlock is paradigmatic of that
which paralyzes regulatory response to other problems similarly stuck in New Federalism limbo, stranded in an unacknowledged gray area between clearer realms of pure state and federal responsibility.
Since the New York decision, complete regulatory stagnation has exacerbated the problem of safe and equitable lowlevel radioactive waste disposal. The states have made no net
progress in creating additional disposal sites; there are still only three facilities for processing the entire nation’s low-level radioactive waste.177 Not a single new facility has been built as
part of the regional compacts created by the Act. Only one new
facility has come on line since the permanent closure of the
Beatty, Nevada site—a private facility in Clive, Utah.178 Because the Clive facility is licensed only to accept the least hazardous class of radioactive waste, its addition does not alleviate the deficit in capacity exacerbated by the loss of the
Beatty site.179 Furthermore, the Clive facility has generated
additional controversy by contracting to accept low-level radioactive waste from Italy, which is projected to hasten the
date by which it will fill to capacity (currently anticipated in
about twenty years).180 Utah and the other member states of
the Northwest Compact have protested,181 but the private site
177. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal
Facilities, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/locations.html (last visited July
14, 2008).
178. See id.
179. Clive’s disposal facility is only licensed to accept “Class A” waste. U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FACT SHEET: ENERGYSOLUTIONS’ PROPOSAL TO
IMPORT LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM ITALY 3 (2008), available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/energysolutions.pdf.
180. Bart Gordon & Jim Matheson, Op-Ed., Importing Nuclear Waste Is in
EnergySolutions’ Best Interests, but Not America’s, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 5, 2008
(noting that EnergySolutions’ claim that it can handle all U.S. waste for the next
19 years was based on unusually low estimates and did not include foreign shipments). The Government Accountability Office reports that we do not even know
how much waste we currently have, and that the “equation will also change” if
more nuclear plants are licensed. Id.
181. On May 8, 2008, the Northwest Compact states passed a resolution attempting to block EnergySolutions’ plans to accept imports of radioactive waste.
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operator is fighting to preserve a likely lucrative contract, given that Europe faces an even greater shortage of disposal options.182 Alarmed at the prospect of further eroding capacity
for domestic waste, both houses of Congress have proposed bills
to forbid domestic sites from accepting international shipments
of radioactive waste.183
South Carolina’s Barnwell site continued to accept the
bulk of waste generated in the eastern United States until July
1, 2008, when it finally acted on the authority conferred in the
Act to close its doors to shipments of waste from outside its regional compact.184 Although the take-title penalty was overturned in New York, the Act’s remaining penalty structure
permitted the sited states to exclude after the deadline. South
Carolina continued to provide access to the many members of
the Southeast Compact (including, for a time, New York—
which had negotiated its way into the compact after its judicial
victory because it still lacked disposal options for its in-state
producers), but South Carolina eventually withdrew from the
Southeast Compact when it became clear that its partner
states were not progressing on their compact obligations to

Charlotte E. Tucker, Dwindling Capacity in U.S. to Handle Low-Level Waste
Prompts Import Questions, 31 INT’L ENVTL. REP. 495, 495 (2008).
182. See, e.g., Warning on Nuclear Waste Disposal, BBC NEWS, Apr. 4, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4407421.stm (discussing the severe
shortage of radioactive waste disposal sites in England). To protect the contract,
Clive’s operator has filed suit in federal court to establish that the Northwest
Compact lacks authority to interfere with the Italian contract because its facility
is not contractually bound by the Northwest Compact. The suit sought a declaratory judgment that the Clive site is a private commercial facility not established
under the authority of the Northwest Compact, and therefore operates outside the
Northwest Compact’s power to approve or deny importation of waste. Tucker, supra note 181, at 495. In February 2009, the judge ruled that the Clive site “ ‘is not
now and has never has been a regional disposal facility’ ” and will soon decide
whether “Congress intended to grant compacts the authority to regulate other facilities.” Amy Joi O’Donoghue, EnergySolutions Wins Small Victory in Bid to
Store Italy’s N-waste, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.deseretnews.com/
article/1,5143,705287580,00.html (quoting Judge Ted Stewart).
183. In response to the Clive site’s proposal, House Representatives Bart Gordon (D-TN), Jim Matheson (D-UT), and Ed Whitfield (R-KY) introduced a bill
(H.R. 5642) that would “ban imports of low-level radioactive waste into the United
States.” Mike Ferullo, Radioactive Waste: Congressmen Offer Bill to Ban Import
of Foreign-Generated Low-Level Waste, 39 ENVTL. REP. 562, 562 (2008). Senators
Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) and Lamar Alexander (R-TN) introduced a similar bill
in the Senate. See S. 3225, 110th Cong. (2008).
184. South Carolina’s Barnwell Closes; Many Without Rad Waste Disposal,
NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, July 7, 2008, at 1.
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share disposal responsibilities.185 At one point, South Carolina
became so incensed over unfair exploitation within the compact
that it initiated a high-stakes constitutional standoff with
North Carolina, from whom it formally ceased accepting waste
shipments in 1995 after North Carolina repeatedly failed to fulfill its compact responsibility to site a new facility.186 The Governor of North Carolina threatened to sue South Carolina under the dormant Commerce Clause,187 though he never
delivered on the threat (perhaps reluctant to litigate with such
patently unclean hands, or perhaps because the Clive site began accepting nationwide shipments around the same time).188
South Carolina eventually joined the much smaller Atlantic
Compact with New Jersey and Connecticut, and as of July 2008
Barnwell will now accept interstate shipments only from these
two states.189
Barnwell’s closure to the rest of the nation has finally triggered the crisis that commanded the attention of Congress and
the National Governors Association during the 1980s. As a nation, we are arguably in an even worse situation than before
the Act and Amendments were passed.190 There are still only
185. See Andrew Meadows, Governor-Elect Wants South Carolina to Rejoin
Nuclear-Waste Group, STATE, Dec. 15, 1998 (reporting on South Carolina’s departure from the Southeast Compact).
186. MARK HOLT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CIVILIAN NUCLEAR WASTE
DISPOSAL 17 (2006), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Sep/RL
33461.pdf.
187. See Jim Clarke, N.C., S.C. at Odds Over Who Can Use Barnwell Landfill,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 26, 1995, available at 1995 WLNR 1767874 (Westlaw NewsRoom).
188. See Richard R. Zuercher, Envirocare Sets Sights on Market for Class A
Commercial LLW, NUCLEONICS WEEK, July 20, 1995, at 1, 1. Nevertheless, four
other states in the Southeast Compact sued North Carolina for some $90 million
in light of its various failures to comply with the terms of the Compact. See Alabama v. North Carolina, 539 U.S. 925 (2003) (granting leave to file complaint);
540 U.S. 1014 (2003) (appointing a special master to handle the litigation). The
case is presently ongoing. E-mail from John F. Maddrey, Assistant Solicitor General, N.C. Dep’t of Justice, to author (Dec. 13, 2006) (on file with author).
189. See Barnwell Closure Results in Revised Storage Guidance, NUCLEAR
NEWS, July 2008, at 19 (noting that its declining disposal capacity has forced
Barnwell to discontinue its open-door policy and accept only from within the Atlantic Compact).
190. The one silver lining to this continued failure is that the increasing costs
of low-level radioactive waste disposal has somewhat dampened supply, slowing
the pace of the looming crisis, but also the pace of potentially life-saving medical
research. See Gregory B. Jaczko, Comm’r, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Remarks at the Electric Power Research Institute’s 2007 International Low Level
Waste Conference and Exhibit Show: The Need for Alternatives in Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (June 26, 2007), available at http://www.nrc.gov/read
ing-rm/doc-collections/commission/speeches/2007/S-07-033.html
(acknowledging
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three low-level radioactive waste facilities nationwide. Hanford accepts waste only from the Northwest and Rocky Mountain Compacts, and Barnwell accepts only from the two other
states in the Atlantic Compact. Only Clive will accept shipments from any producer in the entire nation, but Clive accepts
only the least hazardous “Class A” forms of waste, which degrade over a period of one hundred years.191
Hoping to resolve that particular aspect of the capacity crisis with the stroke of a pen, nuclear industry lobbyists have
asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reconsider its
waste classification system.192 The Commission is presently
considering their proposal, which would allow holders of lowlevel radioactive waste to blend the more hazardous Class B
and C wastes (which can take up to five hundred years to degrade) with Class A waste, and classify the resulting product
simply as Class A.193 If adopted, the new system would enable
the Clive site, approved only for Class A waste, to begin accepting the more hazardous forms without taking additional safety
precautions, prompting resounding protest from nearby Utah
residents.194 In addition, Clive is poised to devote a portion of
that the system is broken and noting the stress on medical research). In 2001, the
National Academies commissioned a study finding that the cost of disposal was a
major driver in the directions of medical research. See COMM. ON THE IMPACT OF
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT. POLICY ON BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH IN
THE U. S., BD. ON RADIATION EFFECTS RESEARCH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
IMPACT OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT POLICY ON
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), available at http://
www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10064 (follow “Download Free PDF” hyperlink). The report found that if disposal access were further restricted by additional site closures, medical facilities already stressed to capacity might not be able to
meet the need for additional long term on-site storage. Id. at 37–40.
191. Patty Henetz, Huntsman Signs Waste-Ban Measure, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Feb. 26, 2005, at A6 (reporting that Utah permits only Class A waste, the “least
radioactive but most abundant” form, having banned Class B and C wastes).
192. Fahys, supra note 16 (“[I]n the industry’s latest effort to reduce the
amount of B&C waste that would require expensive storage until new disposal is
found, it has asked the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reconsider its lowlevel waste categories. If successful, nuclear plants and other waste generators
will be able to mix B&C waste with untainted or mildly contaminated waste to
meet Utah’s Class A radioactivity limits—which means it can be buried in EnergySolutions’ Utah landfill.”).
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Editorial, Radioactive Cocktail: Blending Waste Won’t Lessen the
Danger, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 1, 2008 (“Officials from our nation’s nuclear power
industry have devised a magical mathematical formula that miraculously transforms dangerous Class B and Class C nuclear waste into less-ominous Class A
waste.”). As the Tribune observed, “[t]he trouble is, the formula defies the associative property of mathematics, the laws of science and the canons of common
sense. The only way to make A + B + C = A is to remove B and C from the equa-
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its available capacity to importing waste from nations like Italy, further hastening its projected fill date.
Accordingly, the Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner publicly acknowledged in 2007 that “the low-level waste compact
process has not been quite as successful as we would have
hoped.”195
While the NRC has developed national standards for lowlevel radioactive waste disposal in its regulations the agency
does not currently regulate any of the disposal sites in the
United States. The current disposal facilities are all regulated by states. . . .
The Low [L]evel Radioactive Waste Policy Acts of 1980
and 1985 were supposed to ensure a reliable and predicable
means of disposing of low level radioactive waste. The acts
made each state responsible for providing for waste disposal, but I do not believe that the overarching objectives of the
acts will ever be realized.196

Indeed, the citizens of South Carolina, Washington, and Utah
remain unhappily burdened with an unfair share of the entire
nation’s hazardous waste; all citizens remain at risk for waste
transportation accidents over long stretches of public highways; and the nation is that much closer to running out of
available disposal capacity without further options. Rising oil
prices have renewed national interest in nuclear power, but
erecting more nuclear power plants—which produce significant
quantities of both high-level and low-level radioactive waste—
would significantly exacerbate the problem.197
The 1980s collaboration between the states and Congress
used a variety of carrots and sticks to incentivize unsited states

tion.” Id. Even before the new blending proposal, Utahns were already concerned
about attracting more radioactive waste to the state. Judy Fahys, Guv Says ‘N-O’
to N-Dump Times Two, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 11, 2005, at A1 (“Gov. Jon
Huntsman Jr., bent on protecting Utah from becoming a national dumping
ground for radioactive waste, announced Thursday he will reject plans to double
the size of Envirocare of Utah, a landfill for government and reactor cleanup
waste in Tooele County.”). The Governor was reacting to reports that the facility
had accepted 93 percent of government radioactive waste that went to all domestic commercial facilities between 1998 and 2003. Id.
195. Jaczko, supra note 190.
196. Id.
197. Although some waste can temporarily be stored on site, all must be
processed at a proper disposal facility when the plant is eventually decommissioned. See id.
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to take responsibility for their fair share of risk, but New York
dissolved the most persuasive stick, and carrots have proved
insufficient. The states have lost any incentive to resolve the
collective-action problem without a means of enforcing the
needed interstate bargain. Congress, having been judicially
disciplined on federalism grounds for an attempt made with
due respect for state autonomy, has lost all incentive to impose
a top-down solution that (even if legal) will engender serious
federalism friction. Neither Congress nor the states have meaningfully wrestled with the resulting regulatory “hot potato”
since then, each side seeming to conclude from their loss in
court that the status quo is really the other’s problem.198 Yet
solving the problem of equitable radioactive waste disposal has
proved the exclusive province of neither one nor the other side
alone; it is an interjurisdictional problem best tackled with the
unique regulatory capacities that both Congress and the States
bring to bear.
E.

Tenth Amendment Inalienability and the Gray Area

Problems like this occupy an interjurisdictional gray area
at the margins of clear state and federal prerogative, demanding regulatory attention at both the local and national level.
Sometimes, this is because neither side has all the legal jurisdiction needed to address the problem (for example, in dealing
with water pollution, which passes from land uses regulated at
the state level into water bodies regulated at the federal level).199 Sometimes, the federal government could but declines to
preempt state involvement under its enumerated powers because the state needs regulatory capacity that the federal government can only acquire by replicating the state apparatus
198. Ryan, supra note 2, at 588–90. Of note, Utah, Maine, and Vermont have
each attempted to assert some authority over the production of low-level radioactive waste within their borders, requiring new and relicensing nuclear facilities to
obtain approval from governors, legislatures, and/or voters, though one commentator has suggested that this legislation violates the Supremacy Clause. Melissa
B. Orien, Battle over Control of Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Some States Are
Overstepping Their Bounds, 2005 BYU L. REV. 155, 156 (2005) (“If a state enacts a
statute that conflicts with federal goals for LLRW, then the statute is preempted
by federal law.”).
199. Ryan, supra note 2, at 572–80 (describing such “de jure” interjurisdictional regulatory problems); see also id. at 514, 570 (limiting the discussion of “regulatory problems” to the classic targets of administrative law, including “market failures, negative externalities, and other collective-action problems that individuals
are ill-equipped to resolve on their own”).
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that generates it (for example, the local expertise that facilitates counter-terrorism and disaster response efforts).200 Federal duplication of state government would not only be foolishly
inefficient, it would threaten the very federalism values that
motivate the Tenth Amendment in the first place.
The three intervening decades since the Act was passed
have demonstrated that coordinating safe and equitable radioactive waste disposal is among the more stubborn regulatory problems that have become stranded in the interjurisdictional gray area. The New York saga reveals it as a matter
that concerns both the states and the federal government, and
one whose resolution requires the unique capacity that each
can offer. It is a textbook national collective-action problem requiring a federal umpire, in that none of the states wants to
site the hazardous facility that all of them nevertheless need,
with each state hoping to “free-ride” on another’s sacrifice.201
After all, Congress became involved only after the states, acting separately, were fast approaching one of two unacceptable
outcomes (either South Carolina would remain the unwilling
bearer of all other free-riding states’ costs, or it would close its
site altogether and leave the entire nation without safe disposal options). At the same time, it is a textbook example of a local land-use problem in which surrounding communities have
profoundly unique interests. Siting a hazardous waste facility
implicates the very governmental decision making about landuse planning that is the hallmark province of state and local
government—and for good reason, bearing as it does on issues
of property law, public health and safety, community stability,
and other equitable matters of uniquely local concern.202 Even
200. Id. at 580–84 (describing such “de facto” interjurisdictional regulatory
problems).
201. That is, unless the states were to outlaw production of this kind of waste
altogether, a proposal that no state has yet adopted. See generally U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM’N, RADIOACTIVE WASTE: PRODUCTION, STORAGE, DISPOSAL
(2002), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/bro
chures/br0216/r2/br0216r2.pdf.
202. For example, several states require municipal or local voter approval of
new or renewed licenses for low level radioactive waste facilities, consistent with
the traditional role of local government in approving land uses that would affect
neighboring homes and businesses. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1493
(2001) (requiring state-wide voter approval of LLRW sites); UTAH CODE ANN. §
19-3-105(3) (2007) (requiring municipal approval of LLRW processing facilities);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7012(f) (2006) (requiring local voter approval of LLRW
sites). The hurdles created by these statutes indicate the tension between the parochialism that can accompany local land-use authority and the need for a nationally-mediated program to create disposal capacity for unavoidable radioactive
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the Court conceded that the problem occupies an interjurisdictional zone, in its recognition that both the states and federal
government are empowered to regulate there.203 As with many
such interjurisdictional regulatory problems, a partnership approach is appropriate, desirable, and possibly the only effective
means of proceeding. Why, then, is such collaboration so difficult to realize?
At least part of the problem is that through such banner
New Federalism decisions as New York, the Supreme Court
has endorsed an idealized model of dual sovereignty that fails
to account for the messy reality of interjurisdictional regulatory
problems, and inadvertently frustrates the negotiation of certain state-federal partnerships needed to resolve them. Although the New Federalism’s model posits mutually exclusive
spheres of clearly identified state and federal jurisdiction, persistent problems like equitable low-level radioactive waste disposal call attention to an interjurisdictional gray area between
them, where the spheres partly overlap.204 For regulatory
problems in the gray area, efficient resolution requires participation by both the state and federal governments—either for
the unique jurisdictional authority each holds (for example, in
regulating water pollution, which triggers federal authority
under the Commerce Clause but also local authority in regulating the land uses that cause most water pollution)205 or for the
unique regulatory capacity that each side brings to the table
(for example, in counterterrorism and disaster relief, in which
the federal government does not preempt state involvement because localized capacity is critical to effective on-the-ground reconnaissance and response).206 Effective coordination is often
stunted by the New Federalism’s bright line of strict jurisdicwaste. Such statutes acknowledge the traditional role of local government in approving local land uses that affect neighboring homes and businesses, but they
may exacerbate the not-in-my-backyard (“NIMBY”) phenomenon that has obstructed the development of new capacity needed to handle the nation’s waste
load. For this reason, a regulatory approach is needed that can both appropriately honor local interests while also refereeing the nationwide collective-action problem in which all communities would prefer to free-ride on another neighborhood’s
risk-taking.
203. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Constitution
permits both the Federal Government and the States to enact legislation regarding the disposal of low level radioactive waste.”).
204. Ryan, supra note 2, at 567–72 (defining the interjurisdictional gray area).
205. Id. at 574–80 (describing the “de jure” interjurisdictional regulatory problem of water pollution).
206. Id. at 580–84 (describing the “de facto” interjurisdictional regulatory problems of air pollution and counterterrorism efforts).
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tional separation,207 as Congress’s adoption of the state-based
solution was later eviscerated by the inalienability rule articulated in New York.
The state-federal partnership approach taken in the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Act was not the only way to
tackle this interjurisdictional regulatory problem,208 but it was
a solid plan that drew unanimous support from Congress and
each of the states.209 Although the most serious environmental
justice questions were preserved for the ultimate siting decisions,210 the state-based approach promised at least a rough
environmental justice between the states, guaranteeing that
the burden of environmental risk would be shared throughout
the nation. By forcing all the states to internalize costs they
had previously been happy to externalize to South Carolina,
Nevada, and Washington, the Act would have realigned the interests of voters and lawmakers nationwide toward better
regulatory decision making about the production and use of
materials that none wished to host later as waste. Local communities would have more voice under the state-based solution
than they would have under a fully federalized approach. The
states were thus willing to accept the contained prescription of
federal interference implied by the take-title penalty because
they preferred it to the alternative, by which Congress might
rely on its commerce authority to craft a federal solution that
preempted state input from top to bottom.211

207. Id. at 584–96 (critiquing the impacts of the dual federalism model on interjurisdictional regulatory response).
208. John Dinan, Congressional Responses to the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 32 PUBLIUS 1, 12 (2002) (arguing that Congress had viable options for
coping with the problem even after New York because it could persuade state action via its spending power or directly regulate waste producers under its commerce authority).
209. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, Inc., Supporting a State and Regional Approach to a Complex Environmental Issue, http://www.llwforum.org (last
visited Aug. 27, 2009) [hereinafter LLRW Forum] (noting that both the original
1980 legislation and the 1985 amendments “were endorsed by the Governors of
the 50 states”).
210. Low-income and minority neighborhoods bear a disproportionate percentage of the national burden of hosting hazardous waste facilities, which contribute
to high rates of asthma and other health problems in host communities. E.g., Anna Kuchment, Into the Wilds of Oakland, Calif.: Young Pollution Sleuths and
Community Activists Fight for Healthier Air, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 2008, at 49, 50.
211. No state voted against the state-based solution that was proposed at the
1980 meeting of the National Governors’ Association, and which the Association
then took to Congress. See LLRW Forum, supra note 209. Had one of the states
opposed the terms of the state-based solution during this process and later sued to

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1350008

2010]

FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL

59

The ultimate question is whether the states should have
been able to make this choice. In other words, even if the
Tenth Amendment gives states the means to protest federal interference when it would thwart the good governance values
advanced by constitutional federalism, should they also be able
to waive their entitlement when doing so would promote those
values? After all, American federalism erects not only the
checks and balances that curb both state and federal power,
but also enables the potential for harnessing local and national
expertise into regulatory partnerships to enable what neither
the states nor the federal government could accomplish
alone.212
Coordinating an effective resolution to the national collective-action/local land-use problem of radioactive waste disposal
is a single example of many in this variety, each stuck in the
limbo of the interjurisdictional gray area so obscured by the
New Federalism ideal. Many other interjurisdictional regulatory problems have also become the subject of negotiated statefederal partnerships, and many others would benefit from the
alternative. Indeed, although New York is the only case that
explicitly states the inalienability rule, it is hardly the only one
affected.
For example, a decade of deliberations preceded the Phase
II Stormwater Rule of the Clean Water Act, during which the
states and federal government collaborated in the design of a
national-local regulatory partnership ideally suited to the interjurisdictional task of protecting the nation’s waters from local stormwater pollution.213 Protecting navigable waters is a
matter of federal jurisdiction, but most land uses that are the
source of stormwater pollution are under the jurisdiction of
invalidate the Act, it would have presented an interesting twist on the waiver
question that was not raised by the facts accompanying New York’s suit.
212. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 619 (noting that “it was the early States’ recognition that centralized coordination was necessary to realize efficient interstate
commerce, provide for the common defense, and resolve interstate disputes that
led to the rejection of the Articles of Confederation in favor of constitutional federalism”); see also id. at 655–58 (discussing how American federalism is designed
to facilitate problem solving at the most local level with capacity, which may require partnership approaches in the interjurisdictional gray area).
213. See Brief of Respondent-Intervenor Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. at 50, Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.
2003) (Nos. 00-70014, 00-70734, 00-70822), 2001 WL 34092891 (listing participants of the Phase II Subcommittee); OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, STORM WATER DISCHARGES POTENTIALLY ADDRESSED BY PHASE II OF
THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM STORM WATER
PROGRAM 1-21 to -22 (1995).
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state and local government.214 Recognizing this intersection,
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
invited the states and their localities to participate in the creation of a regulatory program, which—like the state-based solution in New York—departed from the conditional spending and
preemption models to empower municipalities directly in designing localized pollution controls that satisfied EPA’s baseline requirements.215
Nevertheless, EPA’s oversight of local stormwater permitting required under the Plan was challenged as a commandeering of state sovereign authority.216 The Ninth Circuit narrowly
upheld the permitting program, but only by painstakingly establishing that municipalities could avoid the challenged oversight by invoking an alternative available under a separate
section of the Clean Water Act.217 It took the panel two opinions over three years to establish this, which it did over a vigorous dissent.218 Without the inalienability rule, the court
might have more simply concluded that the states had waived
their Tenth Amendment entitlement in consenting to the collaboration they helped create (and better still, the states could
have simply specified it as so). Although the Phase II Rule ultimately survived the Tenth Amendment challenge, the fact
that this negotiated partnership was nearly undone by complex
anti-commandeering litigation further chills other attempts at
non-spending-power bargaining to cope with other interjurisdictional crises.
Similar issues arise as legislators struggle to reconcile new
federal climate initiatives with the various state laws passed
while federal attention to the issue was unforthcoming. Over
most of the past decade, states have led the charge to reduce
214. Land-based activities that contribute to stormwater pollution, such as real
estate development, impervious surfacing, and the use of fertilizers and pesticides
in lawn care, are matters of state concern. E.g., City of Abilene v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 325 F.3d 657, 659–60 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing the permit process
by which municipalities collaborate with the EPA to prevent stormwater pollution
from reaching municipal sewer systems). See generally ENVTL. LAW INST.,
ALMANAC OF ENFORCEABLE STATE LAWS TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCE WATER
POLLUTION (1998) (listing relevant state laws).
215. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Stormwater Program, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npd
es/home.cfm?program_id=6 (last visited Aug. 27, 2009).
216. See City of Abilene, 325 F.3d at 659–60.
217. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EDC I), 319 F.3d 398,
415 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003).
218. See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EDC II), 344 F.3d
832, 845 (9th Cir. 2003) (confirming its original holding in EDC I upholding the
regulatory partnership against the Tenth Amendment challenge).
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Americans’ greenhouse gas emissions,219 but even the architects of these programs urge that national leadership is needed
for success.220 Many acknowledge the need for federally uniform standards and obligations for regulated parties that operate in more than one state, but others observe that the states
are uniquely situated to regulate many causes of greenhouse
gas production within their traditional police powers over
health, safety, and land uses, and to tailor policies to regional
differences.221 States that followed California’s lead in regulating greenhouse gas emissions by automobiles (under a Clean
Air Act provision that authorizes both the EPA and California
to set standards and allows other states to choose between
them) were confronted with unsettling (though ultimately unsuccessful) lawsuits by the automobile industry arguing that
California’s standards are federally preempted.222 Congress
219. See, e.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., John C. Dernbach & Thomas D. Peterson, Federal Climate Change Legislation as if the States Matter, NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T, Winter 2008, at 3, 4 (describing eight northeastern states’ Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, six western states’ and two Canadian provinces’ Western Climate Initiative, and the Climate Registry, which includes thirty-nine
states and two Canadian provinces). See generally The Climate Registry,
http://www.theclimateregistry.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2009); RGGI, Inc., Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2009);
Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last visited
Aug. 28, 2009).
220. See, e.g., McKinstry, Dernbach & Peterson, supra note 219, at 3 (“Most
observers, even at the state level, see state and regional efforts as a next-best
strategy in the absence of serious national leadership.”).
221. Id. at 4–5, 7–8. The scholarly literature is also brimming with discussion
about the challenges posed by the uncertain impact of federalism doctrines for effective climate change regulation. See generally Holly Doremus & W. Michael
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799
(2008); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does
This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006);
Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 879 (2008); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate
Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV.
U. L. REV. 791 (2008); David Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism:
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority (Ariz. Legal
Studies, Discussion Paper No. 07-23, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1016767; Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change (UCLA Sch. of
Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-09,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115556.
222. See, e.g., Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 588 F. Supp. 2d 224, 227–28
(D.R.I. 2008) (affirming decisions in Vermont and California that neither the
Clean Air Act nor the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, which set miles-pergallon standards for motor vehicles, preempted state greenhouse gas emission
standards); Marc Lifsher & John O’Dell, Automakers Challenge States’ Emissions
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has considered at least seven different comprehensive climate
change bills that would have applied to all sectors of the economy,223 but each was criticized for failing to better collaborate
with existing state programs and leverage state expertise and
regulatory capacity, and none made it to the President’s
desk.224 There may be many reasons why Congress has not
better engaged the states, but among them is the fear, stoked
by the New York inalienability rule, that enlisting state agents
as partners in a federal regulatory program may invite legal
challenges—as the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
and Phase II Stormwater Rule did—even when the states are
willing partners.
Because New York rendered bargaining over commandeering illegal, Congress and the states have never again replicated
the precise form of partnership there invalidated, and it is thus
hard to know how frequently instances of such bargaining
would arise otherwise. The Phase II Stormwater Rule comes
closest, although that plan was carefully crafted with a (baroque) “opt-out” provision—inspired by New York, and made
possible by the fact that its regulatory target did not hinge on
the prevention of a collective-action problem requiring uniform
participation (like radioactive waste disposal). Although we
cannot now know precisely how often anti-commandeering bargaining will prove useful, we do know how many problems languishing in the interjurisdictional gray area need new regulatory approaches, and we can surmise that many could benefit
Laws, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at C2 (describing the later-dismissed suit
against Vermont’s tailpipe standards for greenhouse gases, which were based on a
California standard that had been adopted by ten other states). The new administration is taking a more aggressive approach to tailpipe emissions, and showing
greater willingness to allow states to lead. Janet Raloff, California May Yet Get
the First Greenhouse Gas Limits for Cars, SCIENCENEWS, Feb. 6, 2009, http://
www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/40664 (reporting that President Obama directed the EPA to review the previous administration’s refusal to let California
set tough tailpipe-emissions standards for new cars and trucks).
223. McKinstry, Dernbach & Peterson, supra note 219, at 3–4; America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007); Low Carbon Economy Act
of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007); Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th
Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship Act of 2007, H.R. 620, 110th Cong. (2007);
Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship and
Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. (2007).
224. McKinstry, Dernbach & Peterson, supra note 219, at 3–4; cf. Darren Samuelsohn, Senate Leader Says Energy, Climate Bills Will Be Combined, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/03/05/05climatewire-sen
ate-dems-to-put-energy-emissions-bills-in-10009.html (reporting on ongoing efforts to regulate climate impacts).
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from greater flexibility in how intergovernmental partnerships
might be formed, especially those confronting collective-action
hurdles.225 The New York inalienability rule removes a potentially fruitful tool from a toolbox with few others, a toolbox to
which state and federal regulators must increasingly turn to
combat our most difficult regulatory problems.
Scholars have increasingly recognized the challenge of
managing interjurisdictional regulatory problems within the
New Federalism paradigm, and many have questioned the usefulness of a theoretical model that so poorly tracks the real
world it seeks to order.226 Some critics suggest that American
federalism has outlived its relevance in general,227 while others
advocate alternative federalism models that better reflect the
complex reality of the regulatory landscape.228 For example, in
225. Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (suggesting that even outright commandeering
can confer benefits for the role of states in a federal system).
226. See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 108, 108–09 (2005) (noting the “benefits of regulatory overlap [and]
cooperative federalism structures”); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8–14 (2003) (examining how the “regulatory commons problem” can generate regulatory gaps for
interjurisdictional problems like urban sprawl and global warming); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1,
4–8 (1997) (proposing a normative model of collaborative governance that involves
cooperation between agencies and government in the administrative process); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243,
248–49 (2005) (proposing the concept of polyphonic federalism, where the focus is
placed upon the interaction between state and federal authority, rather than upon
where the two spheres diverge); see generally Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the
Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006)
(arguing that the static allocation of regulatory authority to either state or federal
government obstructs good environmental management, and that broadly overlapping state and federal jurisdiction is needed).
227. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908–14 (1994) (arguing that the original
colonial benefits of federalism no longer apply in the modern United States).
228. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570, 653 (1996) (arguing for “multiple tiers of governmental activity
in the environmental domain”); Hills, supra note 29, at 816–17, 938–44 (arguing
for local autonomy on a functional basis, as opposed to the New Federalism’s focus
on principles of dual sovereignty and political accountability); Nolon, supra note
37, at 18–20 (advancing a model of integrated federalism that relies on greater
cooperation based on each governmental actor’s capacity for problem solving in a
given context); Schapiro, supra note 37, at 1466–68 (proposing a framework
whereby federal and state courts participate together in developing constitutional
law); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 719–20 (2001) (concluding that a “reverse-Erie”
doctrine is needed to balance federal supremacy and state autonomy in the administrative context); Kimberly C. Galligan, Note, ACORN v. Edwards: Did the
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previous work, I have advocated for a model of “Balanced Federalism” that better accounts for the interjurisdictional gray
area and mediates the inevitable tension between each of the
various values that undergird American federalism, including
not only the checks and balances privileged by the separationist ideal of the New Federalism model but also the values of localism, accountability, and subsidiarity-tempered problem solving.229 Proposals like these keep us honest and thoughtful
about the American experiment, but the adaptation required
before any would yield fruit is unlikely to materialize quickly
enough to provide meaningful gray-area solutions in the short
run.
Still, there is fruit hanging lower on the tree, even now, in
easy reach of the Supreme Court even from within its chosen
paradigm. The Court could easily enable progress in the gray
area from within the New Federalism model, facilitating the
negotiation of needed state-federal partnerships with minimal
change to existing precedents. A slight adjustment could preserve most of what the New Federalism revival has accomplished while encouraging the resolution of problems that have
languished in the gray area since New York was decided.
Without upsetting the substance of the Tenth Amendment
anti-commandeering rule or any other important New Federalism precedents, the Court could simply replace the jurisprudential inalienability rule with a property-rule remedy.

Fifth Circuit Squirrel Away States’ Tenth Amendment Rights at the Cost of National Environmental Welfare?, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 479, 508–09 (1998) (arguing
for a middle-of-the-road approach to federal-state cooperation).
229. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 644–665. To remedy the theoretical problems
left unresolved by cooperative federalism and the pragmatic ones caused by New
Federalism, I argue that the Court should adopt a model of Balanced Federalism
that better mediates between competing federalism values and provides greater
guidance for regulatory decision making in the interjurisdictional gray area.
Where the New Federalism asks the Tenth Amendment to police a stylized boundary between state and federal authority from crossover by either side, Balanced
Federalism asks the Tenth Amendment to patrol regulatory activity within the
gray area for impermissible compromises of fundamental federalism values. The
article concludes by introducing the outlines of a jurisprudential standard for interpreting Tenth Amendment claims within a model of Balanced Federalism dual
sovereignty that affords both checks and balances. Id.
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III. TOWARD BARGAINING IN THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL GRAY
AREA: A PROPERTY RULE APPROACH
When the anti-commandeering rule made New York the
most celebrated case of the New Federalism revival, the inalienability rule tucked in to protect it garnered far less attention. The Supreme Court has never revisited this aspect of the
rule, and the relevant language in New York has never been
cited in a subsequent case, favorably or otherwise. Nor has it
attracted previous scholarly inquiry. But what the inalienability rule lacks in charisma, it makes up for in potency: the
states and Congress have never again attempted to replicate
the partnership lawmaking model that produced the ill-fated
Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act. In the name of federalism, state-federal bargaining has been confined to the conditional spending model, despite its foreclosure of stateleadership opportunities and collective-action resolution.
Of course, it could be that this model was so flawed that its
short-lived influence is well deserved. On the other hand, the
states and Congress have not since produced a meaningful alternative for the safe and equitable disposal of radioactive
waste in interstate commerce.230 The fact that—but for New
York’s self-serving challenge—the Act seemed poised to succeed
where nothing else has raises the fair question whether preventing the states from bargaining with their entitlement is
truly a good idea. Neither the normative nor the remedial element of the anti-commandeering rule is specified in the text of
the Tenth Amendment itself, but even if we stipulate that the
substance of the rule is constitutionally required, the remedial
aspect is as open to interpretation as those attaching to the
Sixth or Eleventh Amendments. In the absence of a clear textual directive or entrenched precedent on the matter (and the
Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence over the last century
can be called anything but entrenched231), the jurisprudential
nature of the determination invites interpretive and policy con230. Of note, this Article deals only with the problem of low-level radioactive
waste disposal, but the problem of how to safely and equitably dispose of highlevel radioactive waste (the most toxic byproducts of nuclear reactors and weapons programs) is just as pressing. The current federal plan is to store such waste
in a national deposit under Yucca Mountain in Nevada, which remains the subject
of vociferous protest among Nevadans unhappy about bearing the entire nation’s
share of risk. E.g., Rizo, supra note 104.
231. E.g., Ryan, supra note 2, at 539–49 (reviewing vacillations in the Court’s
twentieth century federalism jurisprudence).
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siderations about whether the inalienability approach actually
makes sense.
If the purpose of the Tenth Amendment is to protect the
fundamental federalism values, which remedial rule best accomplishes that? Even if protecting the anti-commandeering
entitlement with an inalienability rule makes sense some of
the time, does it make sense all of the time, as would justify
the universal quash on this form of state-federal bargaining?
Why not enable the kind of consensual bargaining that the
state of New York apparently favored when it lobbied for federal passage of the state-based approach? And if not in all cases,
then at least those in the uncertain territory of the interjurisdictional gray area, where novel intergovernmental bargaining
may be the key to resolving otherwise intractable problems?
This Part proposes that the Court protect the anticommandeering entitlement with a property rule instead, rejecting the weak rationales that the Court offered in support of
the inalienability approach.
A.

The Property Rule Approach

Some barriers to interjurisdictional problem solving
created by the New Federalism’s line of strict jurisdictional
separation could be surgically alleviated, simply by enabling
bargaining around that line under a property rule.
1.

The Case for a Property Rule

The property rule approach distinguishes itself from the
others in the Cathedral framework by enabling the parties to
shift entitlements through consensual bargaining. Liability
rules allow competitors to shift the entitlement over the holder’s protest, and inalienability rules force the parties to live
with the initial distribution even if both would prefer otherwise. In the interjurisdictional gray area, the inalienability
approach frustrates the problem-solving value of federalism,
while a liability rule that would enable the usurpation of state
sovereign authority would threaten the value of checks and
balances. However, a property rule that enables the state to
decide for itself would satisfy all federalism values. It would
advance the problem-solving value by facilitating the negotiation of regulatory partnerships needed to solve interjurisdictional problems. It would advance the values associated with
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local autonomy by preserving decision-making authority to the
states. And it would respect the check-and-balance value, protecting the fundamental order of American dual sovereignty, by
reserving veto rights over waiver to the states.
A property rule would also take advantage of a primary
architectural feature of the existing New Federalism Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence. The New Federalism’s otherwise
controversial bright-line approach to jurisdictional separation
heralds one potential advantage for state-federal bargaining:
bright lines can help facilitate efficient bargaining where bargaining is desirable, as it would be in the gray area. Ideally,
bright lines delineate the relevant parameters of a bargaining
environment232—who holds which entitlement, the available
media of exchange, and each party’s best alternative to reaching agreement. The pro-bargaining potential in the New Federalism model reveals the great inefficient irony of the New York
rule: The substantive anti-commandeering element of the rule
enhances state autonomy by preventing federal coercion, drawing a line in the sand between state and federal entitlements
that could facilitate consensually negotiated partnerships
around that line. Then the remedial element undermines state
autonomy by preventing the very bargains facilitated by the
bright-line substantive element. (Bad infrastructure indeed.)
Moreover, the property rule would facilitate the efficient
resolution of interjurisdictional uncertainty in important ways
that the inalienability rule cannot. The inalienability approach
exacerbates inherent problems with the line-drawing enterprise to begin with, as demonstrated by none other than Professor Coase. The Coase Theorem teaches that bargaining protects against errors made in the initial assignment of legal
entitlements under conditions of uncertainty,233 and—at least
in the interjurisdictional gray area—uncertainty pervades the
initial allocation of regulatory jurisdiction at the margins of the
New Federalism’s paradigm of mutual exclusivity. Indeed,
when the regulatory target implicates both state and federal
obligations, the assignment of the jurisdictional entitlement
exclusively to either the state or the federal government proves
232. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577, 577 (1988).
233. Coase, supra note 38, at 15 (“It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such
market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take
place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.”).
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essentially arbitrary. As described above, the New Federalism’s strict protection of these arbitrary assignments has variously led to regulatory uncertainty, gridlock, litigation, and
abdication, such as that which has plagued not only the regulation of low-level radioactive waste, stormwater pollution,234 and
wetlands,235 but even governmental response to threats of terrorism and natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina.236
By contrast, property-rule protection for Tenth Amendment entitlements would enable states to engage in the very
bargaining that Coase, Calabresi, and Melamed all predict will
facilitate efficiency when uncertainty muddles the initial allocation.237 Calabresi and Melamed explain that the law can
help maximize efficiency by assigning entitlements to reflect
Pareto optimality (“that allocation of resources which could not
be improved in the sense that a further change would not so
improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could
compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than
before”),238 or that which yields the most overall societal value
and fewest overall societal costs.239 However, when there is
234. See supra notes 213–18 and accompanying text (describing challenges to
the Phase II Stormwater Rule).
235. In Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731–32 (2006), a fractured Supreme Court rejected portions of the Army Corps of Engineers’ jurisdictional
guidelines regarding wetlands regulation without achieving consensus on how the
Corps might establish permissible guidelines, throwing the field into further disarray. See also Jeff Kinney, Internal EPA Memo Finds Enforcement Decreased
Following Rapanos Decision, 39 ENV’T REP. 1392 (2008) (reporting on a House
oversight committee investigation of post-Rapanos Clean Water Act enforcement
and an internal EPA memorandum stating that the Rapanos decision may be undermining “EPA’s ability to maintain an effective enforcement program”).
236. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 567–95 (critiquing the impacts of the dual federalism model on regulatory response in each of these interjurisdictional scenarios); Dickey, supra note 3 (reporting on national security conflicts).
237. See Coase, supra note 38, at 15; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at
1093–95 (noting Coase’s argument that “economic efficiency will occur regardless
of the initial entitlement” in the absence of transaction costs, which “must be understood extremely broadly as involving . . . the absence of any impediments or
costs of negotiating”).
238. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1093–94 (“[E]conomic efficiency
asks for that combination of entitlements to engage in risky activities and to be
free from harm from risky activities which will most likely lead to the lowest sum
of accident costs and of costs of avoiding accidents. It asks for that form of property, private or communal, which leads to the highest product for the effort of producing.”).
239. Although Calabresi and Melamed take economic efficiency as a primary
consideration in the allocation of legal entitlements, they are clear that it is not
the only basis on which the law should choose; additional considerations include
the unique “other justice reasons” and distributional preferences of any given society. Id. at 1098–1105.
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uncertainty about which initial distribution would best maximize benefits and minimize costs, efficiency can only be realized by allowing entitlements to shift until a Pareto optimal
allocation is reached.240
Assigning regulatory jurisdiction to either the state or federal government in the interjurisdictional gray area is a project
of uncertainty by definition, refereed by well-intended but fallible human beings. To then defend these entitlements with an
inalienability rule fixes errors in the arbitrary initial assignment forever. The property rule would protect the division of
state and federal power while empowering both to take the
needed steps in negotiating the kinds of partnerships that can
effectively cope with interjurisdictional quagmires.
Key is the property rule’s element of choice. In empowering the entitlement holder to decide for itself whether or not to
bargain, the property rule approach enhances state sovereignty
by supporting local autonomy—a federalism value on par with
checks and balances.241 A classic statement of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is that states should not be “compelled” to
participate in a federal regulatory program,242 and even more
recent decisions emphasize the centrality of preventing federal
“coercion” of the states.243 But where the states invite federal
regulation—if only to make it possible to enforce their own
agreements against corrosive collective-action problems—there
is no coercion. The consensual element inherent in property
rule protection means that states will not waive their Tenth
Amendment state sovereignty unless they elect to do so—just
240. Id. at 1093–97. When there is uncertainty about the initial distribution of
entitlements, the authors suggest that it allocate costs to the party that can best
perform the needed cost-benefit analysis (or most cheaply avoid costs), and if it is
too difficult to determine the least cost avoider, then to the party that can most
cheaply act in the market to correct disparities in the entitlement distribution
(since they expect that our imperfect markets in fact will create transaction costs).
Id. at 1096–97.
241. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 610–20 (discussing the federalism values in
protecting the benefits of localism).
242. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
243. See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EDC II) 344 F.3d
832, 847 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that under the Tenth Amendment, “the Federal
Government may not compel States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs,” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997)) and that “[t]he crucial proscribed element is coercion; the residents of the State or municipality must retain
‘the ultimate decision’ as to whether or not the State or municipality will comply
with the federal regulatory program” (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 168)).
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as they elect to waive sovereign authority when they enter into
spending-power deals that expand federal authority beyond its
initial jurisdictional entitlement.244 Even federalism theorists
who worry that state officials will elect to collude with the federal government in undermining federalism constraints have
conceded that the anti-commandeering context is least vulnerable to their concern. As Professors John McGinnis and Ilya
Somin have explained:
In practice, commandeering is not nearly as great a danger
to federalism as the Spending power and the Commerce
power. State governments often have strong incentives to
resist uncompensated commandeering because, by definition, it deprives them of resources without any offsetting
benefits. For this reason, state governments routinely use
their political power to resist commandeering and other “unfunded mandates.”245

By extension, they are unlikely to choose not to resist commandeering unless it promises substantial offsetting benefits.
Although a detailed account of the mechanics is beyond the
scope of this Article, we can imagine at least the rough sketch
in which a state’s legislature, representing the people in their
corporate capacity,246 could directly waive the state’s anticommandeering entitlement or statutorily authorize the governor to negotiate on behalf of the people as needed. If there was
no waiver, the anti-commandeering entitlement would remain
with the state and could be judicially enforced against federal
overreaching.247 If a given instance of commandeering bargaining were challenged, the court would evaluate the permissibility of the trade based on the litigants’ showing that bargaining
is appropriately within the gray area, or that the regulatory
244. A different case arises if all the states but one agree on a policy, and the
majority persuades Congress to pass a commandeering rule that the dissenting
state could challenge under a property rule approach.
245. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 44, at 119.
246. See supra note 152 (discussing the Court’s explication of the Tenth
Amendment reference to “the people”).
247. Note that by this account of a valid waiver, the New York defendants may
not have been able to satisfy the test for waiver even if one had been made available (since neither the legislature nor the governor acted formally). Similarly, the
federal government would not have been able to defend against the Printz commandeering challenge, because states had not been given an opportunity ex ante
to opt in or out. 521 U.S. at 935. However, were the waiver rule available and
clear, then the parties could structure their behavior to secure clear and legally
adequate waiver beforehand where intended.
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partnership addresses an interjurisdictional problem on which
both sides claim obligation or expertise (and perhaps for which
alternative avenues of resolution are unavailing).248 Allowing
bargaining while placing the burden of persuasion on the bargainers shows proper deference to the check-and-balance value
while preventing it from overshadowing all other considerations of good federalist governance.
Making the change to a property rule would be a relatively
simple jurisprudential fix, as the inalienability rule has not
been visited by the Court since its articulation in New York.
Although the rule remains in force, the Court’s reasoning on
this aspect of the decision has not been invoked in any subsequent decision, such that it has not become an inextricable part
of the fabric of the rest of our jurisprudence. Reversing the inalienability rule would leave other precedents protecting state
sovereignty fully intact, while affording flexibility for intergovernmental bargaining that should not offend them.
In the end, the New York rule simply went farther than
necessary. Enabling commandeering bargaining resonates
with Justice Blackmun’s argument in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority249 that states’ rights are protected by the political process in which state actors play an important role, but the continued enforceability of the anticommandeering entitlement when it is not waived preserves
the role of judicially enforceable federalism constraints.
Meanwhile, affording judicial review to contain bargaining
within the gray area should satisfy concerns that Tenth
Amendment bargaining will not encroach on the uncontroversial realms of purely state or federal authority. In this respect,
the property rule approach would forge a middle path through
the extremes of the Court’s erstwhile vacillating Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence.
Of note, the property rule approach would also free the
federal government to waive its reciprocal Tenth Amendment
entitlement—but that already happens with so much frequency
248. Like Federalism and the Tug of War Within, Ryan, supra note 2, at 570,
this Article does not resolve the absolute boundaries of the interjurisdictional gray
area. That we can identify clear examples within it should suffice to reject a categorical rule premised on its absence. This discussion preserves for later the inevitable arguments over whether a given instance of bargaining takes place in the
gray area where it should be permitted or the poles where it should not be. Nevertheless, the current conversation at least steers the debate into more useful
theoretical territory. Id. at 570–72.
249. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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and so little ado that affirming it is of almost no consequence
except to bring the system back into symmetry.250 The “marble
cake” model of cooperative federalism,251 representing the innumerable places across the regulatory landscape where federal and state jurisdiction really do overlap, is mostly composed
of areas where the federal government could but does not
choose to fully preempt state involvement.252 This is visible not
only in such purposeful collaborative initiatives as the Clean
Air and Clean Water Acts, where the federal and state governments take responsibility for separate but interlocking
parts of a unified regulatory program,253 but also in the concurrent jurisdictional fabric of American law more generally.254
(For example, bankruptcy law is constitutionally enumerated
250. See, e.g., MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8, 60–153 (Daniel J.
Elazar ed., 1966).
251. Id.
252. For example, Congress has created a regime of shared federal and state
authority over the coastal waterways three miles seaward from a state’s coastal
boundary. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466
(2006), offers federal funding and legal regard for state management of these waterways when states submit coastal management plans for approval by the Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). When a coastal management plan is in effect, the federal government
endeavors to comply with the state plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (“Each Federal
agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water
use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which
is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of
approved State management programs.”). The Act requires that federal activity
affecting the coastal zone be consistent with that state’s coastal management policies, in what the Department of Commerce has described as a “limited waiver of
federal supremacy and authority.” Coastal Zone Management Act Federal Consistency Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 788, 789 (Jan. 5, 2006) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt.
930).
253. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006) (allocating roles between the EPA and the states); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006) (delegating standard setting authority to the federal government and program design
and implementation to the states); see also Ryan, supra note 2, at 567–83 (discussing regulatory crossover).
254. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1382–85 (2006) (describing overlapping state and
federal jurisdiction in products liability law); Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm
Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1553–55 (2002) (describing
overlapping state and federal jurisdiction in the context of criminal law); A.
Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297,
299–300 (2003) (discussing the advent of cooperative federal commercial laws,
with particular emphasis on the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act); Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and
the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 145 (2001) (noting
“broad concurrent regulatory authority over the economy” by the state and federal
governments); see also Ryan, supra note 2, at 554–67 (discussing federalism,
preemption, and the related reallocation of authority).
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to the federal government,255 but its administration depends on
property law definitions and conclusions that differ from state
to state.)256 Despite the challenge it poses to the separationist
premise of the New Federalism’s conception of dual sovereignty, the federal government’s frequent waiver of its Tenth
Amendment entitlement has attracted little attention from the
Court—presumably because the Court has not been concerned
about a threat to the overall federal project posed by retained
state power.
Needless to say, the reverse is true: the Court clearly considers unchecked federal power a threat to the overall project of
retained state sovereign authority. It is for this reason that it
protected the states’ Tenth Amendment entitlement so purposefully (and for this reason that the rest of this Article addresses only the states’ entitlement, though the argument applies equally well to its federal counterpart). The inalienability
rule the Court chose to protect Tenth Amendment state sovereign authority misses the mark, but the concerns that drove
the choice suggest what the majority was really afraid of: the
third leg in the Cathedral stool, the liability rule.
2.

Fear of “Liability”

What the majority truly sought to prevent—and with generally good reason—was the adoption of a Cathedral liability
rule. Under a liability rule, the jurisdictional competitor is
empowered not only to bargain for the entitlement, but to swap
compensation for it even over the holder’s protest. It appears
that the Court was so concerned about the threat of liability—
specifically, the threat of federal override of state prerogative—
that it remedially overcompensated.
A liability approach would render a state’s Tenth Amendment entitlement vulnerable to the very kind of federal aggrandizement that the Court most fears. Protecting the Tenth
Amendment entitlement under a liability rule would shift decision-making power about the entitlement to the jurisdictional
competitor—empowering the federal government to condemn
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
256. See, e.g., Felicia Anne Nadborny, Note, ‘Leap of Faith’ into Bankruptcy: An
Examination of the Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic Diocese’s
Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 839, 889 (2005) (noting that although certain property interests are determined by federal bankruptcy standards, bankruptcy courts frequently “look to state law for guidance in determining
what constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate”).
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the entitlement even over a state’s protest (and vice versa), so
long as the loser was somehow “made whole” by the appropriator. The Cathedral authors recommend liability rules when
there is both uncertainty about the initial allocation and high
transaction costs that could prevent otherwise desirable entitlement shifting—a description that applies to state-federal
bargaining in the gray area, which is complicated by uncertainties and practicalities that exceed most private bargaining scenarios.257 But allowing the nonconsensual shifting of entitlements to sovereign authority advances problem solving at too
great a cost to other important federalism values, such as local
autonomy and checks and balances. It would be better simply
to remove some of the obstacles to bargaining that create high
transaction costs in the gray area, which would bring the scenario more in line with those that the Cathedral authors recommend for property rule protection.
One could imagine rare circumstances in which a liability
approach might be appropriate—perhaps where a serious interjurisdictional emergency renders the bargaining process impossible (or intolerably harmful), as may have happened in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina.258 At the time, many argued that
the federal government should have been able to federalize the
Louisiana National Guard and assume command of local first
responders even without gubernatorial permission because the
emergency had so incapacitated the state apparatus that the
relevant state actors might not have been able to take the
needed steps to evaluate and instigate a waiver.259 Professor
Neil Siegel has posed a similar thought-problem about a future
terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11, where the substantive
anti-commandeering rule would prevent the President from assuming command of local first responders to coordinate a centralized response without gubernatorial consent.260 (Reflecting
257. See supra Part I.D.
258. Siegel, supra note 103, at 1687–88; see also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 225 (suggesting that liability-rule commandeering may be a useful regulatory device even in cases other than emergencies).
259. See John Yoo, Editorial, Trigger Power, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at M5;
Michael Greenberger, Yes, Virginia: The President Can Deploy Federal Troops to
Prevent the Loss of a Major American City from a Devastating Natural Catastrophe 14–19 (Univ. of Md. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2006–37, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946207 (arguing that the President had clear authority to intervene even before passage of the Warner Act).
260. Siegel, supra note 103, at 1684–86. Another provocative case that some
argue could warrant a liability approach has already materialized in the slowermotion emergency context of catastrophic injury to children in automobiles. The
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these concerns, the post-Katrina amendments to the Stafford
Act may authorize exactly this kind of federal move.)261 But
even in such compelling circumstances, naked federal commandeering would be highly contentious. For all who argued
that the federal government should have acted more forcefully
during the Katrina response, others argued passionately that
the federal government must not violate state sovereignty.262
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has urged states to require children aged four to eight to use booster seats because most are too large for the infant restraints already required by law, but too small for conventional seatbelts to
work effectively. Adam Hochberg, NTSB Puts Heat On States Without Booster
Seat Laws (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=112884532&ft=1&f=1003.
NTSB estimates
that these children are nearly 60 percent more likely to suffer catastrophic injury
in a car accident when they are not using a booster seat. Id. In light of these statistics, all states have passed laws requiring booster seats except Florida, Arizona,
and South Dakota. State representatives in Florida and Arizona are attempting
to pass booster seat legislation in the coming year, but the Governor of South Dakota recently vetoed his own legislature’s successful booster seat bill on grounds
that such decisions should be left to the family—despite “heart-rending testimony” from parents of injured children who had not used booster seats because they
were following the requirements of child restraint laws that they had assumed
were designed for maximum protection. Id. When a governor vetoes a demonstrated means of halting preventable child deaths in legislation that has been duly approved by the state legislature, which expression of Tenth Amendment sovereignty should prevail? At one level, the answer is easy: state legislation must
yield to the governor’s veto, and a displeased electorate maintains the alternative
of voting that governor out at the next election cycle. Still, the families of children
injured in the intervening years may later consider it the sort of emergency that
should have warranted NTSB override under an anti-commandeering liability
rule.
261. The failed response to Hurricane Katrina—partly the result of poor coordination between the federal government and the incapacitated state and local
governments in New Orleans—motivated the enactment of a federal law that
enables the President to deploy the military in response to major domestic emergencies without consent of the states involved. John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083
(2006); see also Greenberger, supra note 259, at 1–2 (arguing that the new law
neither adds to nor subtracts from the President’s existing powers but merely clarifies them after uncertainty suggested during the Katrina emergency).
262. Cf. Ed McClure, Letter to the Editor, In Times of Catastrophe, Responsibility Starts at Local Level, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at 16A, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/09/06/Opinion/In_times_of_catastrop.shtml
(arguing that the state and local government should have been able to handle the
emergency without more federal involvement); Robert J. Spratlin, Editorial, Bash
Mayor, Governor for Katrina Response, not Bush, BURLINGTON COUNTY TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 6A (arguing that primary responsibility for the disaster response lay with state and local officials, and that the federal government properly
abstained from interfering absent invitation); Posting of Douglas L. Marriott to
USA Today Opinion, http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/09/keep-out-federa.html
(Sept. 5, 2007, 12:07 EST) (arguing against further federal involvement in the recovery effort because large bureaucracies are not effective in dealing with
emergencies).
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Neither is it clear how a liability-rule entitlement shift should
be compensated in this context.
A liability rule could stress the check-and-balance value of
federalism beyond its breaking point, and we can safely presume that in almost all imaginable circumstances, a state that
really needed federal assistance to protect public safety would
simply ask for it—waiving its entitlement to federal noninterference just as the property rule would encourage. Indeed, the
specter of federal override of Tenth Amendment–protected
state sovereign authority is what galvanized the New Federalism revival in the first place.263 Although a liability rule enabling a jurisdictional competitor to claim an entitlement over the
holder’s protest might unduly threaten federalism checks and
balances, a property rule that enabled the holder to choose for
itself would not. The property rule approach honors state autonomy and protects against federal coercion by keeping veto
power in the hands of the entitlement holder—the states.
Thus, even if the uncontroversial poles of purely state and
federal authority were properly protected by an inalienability
rule, the uncertain entitlements in the gray area are exactly
those best protected by a pro-bargaining property rule. New
Federalism proponents may rightly fear the use of a liability
rule to protect the Tenth Amendment entitlement, which might
enable the federal government to condemn areas of state jurisdiction as it can private property for an interstate—but a property rule protects state autonomy by empowering the state as
the ultimate decision maker. Because a state is unlikely to
bargain away its entitlement against its own interests, the
bargaining paradigm would protect the states against the
threat of federal overreaching intended by American federalism. And it would enable the kind of state-federal bargaining
that could make the needed difference in the interjurisdictional
gray area.
B.

The Court’s Defense: Inalienable by Nature and
Necessity

The inalienability approach thus fails the recommendations of the Cathedral framework, but it also fails under the
263. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 642 (discussing how New Federalism “arose out
of concern that the predominant cooperative federalism model fails to adequately
circumscribe federal authority” (emphasis added)); id. at 539–42 (discussing how
the New Federalism seeks to better corral federal authority).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1350008

2010]

FEDERALISM AT THE CATHEDRAL

77

Court’s own rationale in New York. With all the intellectual rigor of an afterthought, the Court essentially defended the new
inalienability rule on two grounds—by nature and by necessity—neither of them satisfying. First, it proclaimed the entitlement inalienable by its very nature, analogizing unsuccessfully to other rights that the state may not waive on behalf of
individuals and to the inalienable horizontal separation of
powers between Congress, the President, and the federal judiciary. It also justified the inalienability rule on grounds of necessity, because the interests of a state’s citizens and their
elected representatives might differ too much to allow the latter to waive on behalf of the former in state-federal negotiations—even though the interests of citizens and their elected
officials in state sovereign authority are remarkably wellaligned. Finally, the Court undermined its reasoning on both
nature and necessity grounds by suggesting that the same
elected officials who should not be able to waive their citizens’
entitlement in negotiations with the federal government might
nevertheless be able to do so in the negotiation with another
state of an interstate compact.
1.

By Nature: An Inherently Inalienable
Entitlement?

The Court first grounded its inalienability approach in the
very nature of the entitlement, grouping the anticommandeering rule with other rights that the state may not
waive on behalf of citizens and to more structural constitutional features, such as the horizontal separation of powers.264 Ultimately, its comparison with other rights that states cannot
waive is unhelpful, since those are rights that citizens hold
against the state, an analogy that simply does not hold in the
context of the Tenth Amendment entitlement to state sovereign
authority. And though the comparison between horizontal and
vertical separation of powers seems more compelling, the Court
fails to distinguish why property-rule protection is somehow
acceptable in other federalism contexts, such as its Eleventh
Amendment and spending-power doctrines.
As an initial matter, the decision forces us to consider
whether the nature of the Tenth Amendment entitlement itself

264. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992). See supra note 161,
for the full quotation.
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requires that it be inalienable. Indeed, some constitutional entitlements are protected by an inalienability rule,265 and probably rightly so. For example, in defending Tenth Amendment
inalienability, the Court analogized to the separation of powers
between Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court,266
which is (weakly) vindicated by the non-delegation doctrine
(preventing Congress from abdicating its role to the executive)267 and the Chevron doctrine of administrative law (preventing the judiciary from encroaching on executive and legislative decision making).268
But even assuming strong
protection for the inalienability of the horizontal separation of
powers, the Court’s analogy fails.
Comparing the horizontal separation of legislative, executive, and judicial power with federalism’s vertical separation of
state and federal power is appealing at first blush, but ultimately unsatisfying when considered in the full context of federalism entitlements that are treated as tradable. The same
state sovereign authority considered sacrosanct under the New
York rule is the subject of bargaining elsewhere, especially
amidst the waivable reciprocal entitlements to regulatory noninterference that are created in the interplay between the
grants and limits on federal power.269 When the states yielded
to a nationally mandated drinking age in exchange for federal
highway funds, they bargained away an entitlement to a particular zone of sovereign authority free from federal interference.270 When they accepted federal education funding in
exchange for instituting a battery of standardized tests, they
bargained away another such entitlement.271 If constitutional
265. In addition to the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of slavery discussed
earlier, see supra Part I.B., another example is the Guarantee Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4, which guarantees each state a republican form of government—though this alleged inalienability may be all bark and no bite, given the
Court’s long tradition of treating claims raised under the Clause as nonjusticiable.
See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 184 (“ ‘[I]t rests with Congress,’ not the judiciary,
‘to decide what government is the established one in a State.’ ” (quoting Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7. How.) 1, 42 (1849))).
266. See supra note 161.
267. But see supra note 164 (discussing the Court’s reluctance to enforce the
non-delegation doctrine for the last 60 years, upholding all delegations to administrative agencies challenged on these grounds).
268. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (holding that a federal agency’s interpretation of its organic statute is entitled to “deference” from the court).
269. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
270. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1987).
271. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–8962 (2006).
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law permits state-federal bargaining around Tenth Amendment defined zones under the spending power, why should the
states’ Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering entitlement be
different?272 Indeed, the majority’s accompanying suggestion
that Congress could work around the take-title commandeering
problem by conditioning state waiver on federal funds implodes
this line of reasoning.273
Perhaps conscious of this weakness in its characterization
of the Tenth Amendment entitlement as an immutable structural feature of the Constitution, the Court also characterized
it as an individual right—reasoning that the entitlement is inalienable in state-federal bargaining because it belongs not to
the state as a state, but to the individuals within the state. After acknowledging that the challenged terms of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act constituted a regulatory bargain
in which New York was a willing beneficiary, the Court asked
and then answered its own rhetorical question in terms of the
individual interests in state sovereign authority. Returning to
Justice O’Connor’s reasoning:
How can a federal statute be found an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty when state officials consented to the statute’s enactment?
The answer follows from an understanding of the fundamental purpose served by our Government’s federal
structure. The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of
the public officials governing the States. To the contrary,
the Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals. State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: “Rather, federalism
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”274

Indeed, no one would argue that the Tenth Amendment does
not protect individuals in this way, but the argument proves
too much—because all constitutional directives exist to protect
272. Noting this inconsistency, some scholars have argued that the New York
entitlement is appropriately inalienable and the others under-protected. See supra note 87.
273. See supra Part II.C.2.
274. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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individuals. Indeed, this is the very purpose of the Constitution; it is what each of its elements is ultimately designed, directly or indirectly, to accomplish.
That it benefits individuals, then, is an unremarkable feature of the Tenth Amendment entitlement. But by invoking its
relationship to individuals, the Court implicitly compared the
entitlement to others in the Bill of Rights that establish clear
individual rights, such as the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial,275 the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
search and seizure,276 or even the First Amendment right to
free speech.277 But even the fact that a constitutional entitlement protects individuals does not necessitate an inalienability
rule, since most constitutional rights—including each of those
mentioned above—are protected under a property rule.278 As
described earlier, citizens frequently bargain away their right
to jury trial for a plea agreement that better meets their interests,279 their right against unreasonable searches when they
choose to cooperate with warrantless police,280 and their right
to free speech when they accept government employment.281 Is
there something else about the nature of Tenth Amendment
state sovereign authority that justifies this inalienability?
To be sure, most constitutional rights that are waivable
under a property rule are not usually waived by the state,
which makes sense, because they are mostly rights held by individual citizens against the state. The First Amendment entitles individuals to speak free from state interference, the
Fourth Amendment entitles them to be free of unreasonable
275. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
276. Id. amend. IV.
277. Id. amend. I.
278. See Merrill, supra note 12, at 1144 (asserting that a property rule governs
the Sixth Amendment); id. at 1164 (“[T]he current regime of protection afforded to
Fourth Amendment rights can be described as a foundational property rule subject to numerous exceptions where we follow what amounts to a police power
rule.”); Seamon, supra note 64, at 1135 n.325 (observing that constitutional rights
are presumptively protected by property rules).
279. In 2003, out of 83,530 defendants in United States District Courts, 74,850
were convicted, 72,110 of whom entered pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003 423 tbl.5.22 (Ann L. Pastore
& Kathleen Maguire eds., 2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t522.pdf.
280. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (observing that a citizen
may willingly waive his rights and provide information that may aid a law enforcement effort).
281. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980) (holding
that a contract between the CIA and one of its employees was valid, even though
it restricted his ability to publish a book about his work for the agency).
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search and seizure by the state, and the Sixth Amendment
guarantees them a fair trial before facing state punishment.
But the Court’s facile invocation of this principle in New York
is dubious, because the Tenth Amendment entitlement—
though it may exist to protect individuals—is not like these
other individual rights. The entitlement at issue in New York
was not held by citizens against New York, or the state officials
who might have waived it; if it was held against anything, that
would have been the federal government. The states’ Tenth
Amendment entitlement, the mirror image of its reciprocal federal counterpart, benefits individuals by delineating a zone of
sovereign authority protected against federal incursion. In this
respect, it seems far less like the First or Fourth Amendment
entitlement than it does its neighboring entitlement, the Eleventh Amendment entitlement to state sovereign immunity—a
medium of state sovereign authority that the Court acknowledges a state can waive.282
The inalienability of the Tenth Amendment entitlement to
state sovereign authority is difficult to reconcile with the freely
alienable Eleventh Amendment entitlement to the same constitutional medium. The Tenth Amendment protects a zone of local regulatory authority, and the Eleventh Amendment protects the fiscal integrity of that level (and perhaps more in
some philosophically significant way, in vindicating the state
as a sovereign not subject to private suit283). While each benefits individuals by empowering them locally within a federal
system, neither is cognizable except as it attaches to the state
as an institution of government. An individual citizen has no
divisible interest in state regulatory authority, or in a state’s
treasury, except as stakeholders within that state. The Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments are thus better understood (as, indeed, they usually are) as conferring collective rights, meaningfully administered by the states qua states, and not to individuals.284 It is for this reason that they have been conventionally
282. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
283. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[A]s the Constitution’s
structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make
clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which
they retain today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments.”).
284. For the most common statement of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
as distinct, see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 557 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that they are “examples” of the Framers’ understanding “that
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grouped together under the banner of “States’ Rights,” even
though their underlying purposes may be to protect citizens
from losing locally based legislative authority and from being
forced as taxpayers to satisfy federal court judgments against
their states. If state sovereign authority is alienable by state
officials in the Eleventh Amendment context, it is hard to understand why it should not also be so in the Tenth Amendment
context.285
Were the relationship to individual interests really the
proper yardstick of inalienability that the Court proposes in
New York, then the most logical arrangement would be the reverse: the Eleventh Amendment should be the inalienable of
the pair, since that one can be much more closely connected
with the protection of discrete individuals’ interests than the
Tenth Amendment entitlement. Discrete individual taxpayers
bear the brunt of legal liability for judgments against their
states, and all else equal, citizens prefer lower to higher taxes—so at least all taxpayers would have a substantially parallel interest in how the Eleventh Amendment entitlement is
used or waived. It is much harder to trace a direct relationship
between use or waiver of the sovereign authority protected by
Tenth Amendment and the interests of discrete individuals,
due to the inevitable policy dissensus among them about how
that authority is used.286 (Demonstrating the breadth of conthe States were sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative
authority could be superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was
competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it
were just another individual or business enterprise subject to regulation”).
285. One could argue that the difference in property—and inalienability—rule
protection can be justified by the fact that the Eleventh Amendment is framed as
a limit on federal power (which the states can waive) and the Tenth as affirming
some reserve of state or people power (which the state cannot waive). However, it
is not clear the Tenth Amendment is really framed differently from the Eleventh
in this regard, since it also represents a limit on federal power, even if it does so
by affirming that reservoir of authority not delegated to the federal government.
More importantly, each amendment creates by its phrasing what amounts to a
reciprocal set of “Hohfeldian” rights and duties. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J.
16, 28–58 (1913). The Eleventh Amendment limitation on federal judicial power
is what creates the meaningful state entitlement to sovereign immunity, just as
the Tenth Amendment’s reciprocal affirmation of state and federal jurisdictional
zones is what suggests the importance of some distinction between them. The
Court could hardly justify so important a difference on the basis of so weak a distinction in phrasing.
286. There may also be policy dissensus among individual citizens about
whether a given suit against their state is worth paying for despite the possibility
of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. However, this dissensus proceeds
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flicting interests among statewide electorates is the aforementioned nonexistence of unanimous elections and referenda at
the state level.)287
Moreover, though all citizens may have a parallel interest
in protecting local authority, it is disputable that preventing
the waiver of the entitlement at issue in New York even protected local authority: where the rubber of that entitlement really hits the road in each case depends on the specific authority
and how it would be used or traded, which will always be different. Citizens’ interests are much more uniform under the
Eleventh Amendment, where they are unified around issues of
finances and judicial process.288 Numerous federal courts have
invoked the centrality of the treasury-protective role by which
the Eleventh Amendment benefits individual citizens’ pocketbooks,289 while New York remains the only Tenth Amendment
decision to characterize the entitlement as a protection for individuals that states may not waive.290

from a baseline shared interest among citizens in the fiscal security of their state,
several steps removed in comparison to such baseline indeterminacy about how
Tenth Amendment regulatory authority is wielded.
287. See supra Part II.C (discussing the impossibility of uniform waiver of the
Tenth Amendment entitlement).
288. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1129 (1983)
(noting that “the traditional core of eleventh amendment protection” is to avoid
“the award of money judgments against the states”).
289. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39, 48 (1994)
(noting that “the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment” was “the prevention of
federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury,” and offering
a litany of preceding appeals court opinions that “have recognized the vulnerability of the State’s purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations”). Cf. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (“The
Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to ‘preven[t] federal-court
judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury’; it also serves to avoid ‘the
indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 48; P.R.
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993))).
290. In New York, Justice O’Connor cites to Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 759 (1991), as precedent for this proposition, but the case provides dubious
support: Coleman was a habeas case that dealt with the ability of the federal
court to grant habeas relief that had been denied by the state court, and the
statement cited is not part of the majority opinion she authored but instead part
of Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion. See New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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By Necessity: The Agent-Accountability Problem

The Court’s other main rationale for the New York inalienability rule centers on the problems of trust and accountability that arise between citizens and their agents in government.
The majority justified the inalienability rule as one of necessity, fearing that constituents might be confused by the intergovernmental bargaining it prohibits and that the interests of
elected officials may depart too significantly from that of their
electorates to warrant power to waive their constituents’ entitlement.291 However, both the empirical and theoretical
bases of the Court’s accountability concerns are flawed.
First, the majority worried that enabling state legislators
to bargain with Congress this way would undermine the accountability value of federalism, highlighting citizens’ need to
monitor the effectiveness of their representation in state and
federal government (and take corrective action as needed).292
When state legislators bind themselves under federal law in
negotiations with Congress, the Court explained, they make it
harder for constituents to know whom to blame if they do not
like the resulting laws.293 However, this argument has been
roundly criticized for resting on the unsupported empirical
premises that (1) voters cannot tell what level of government is
to blame for a given policy, and (2) state and local officials are
unable to tell them when the fault truly lies in Washington.294
The Court’s reasoning assumes that voters are either unable to
understand interaction between the federal and state governments and/or that they cannot voice corrective preferences
through their federal representation, though significant evidence suggests otherwise.295 (For example, warned by their
state representatives that the federal government was increasingly requiring their states to implement “unfunded mandates,” voters persuaded their federal representatives to reign
in the practice by passing the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995.)296
291. See New York, 505 U.S. at 182–83.
292. Id. at 168–69 (noting that “where the Federal Government compels States
to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished” by
making it harder for voters to keep track of who is responsible for which policies).
293. Id.
294. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 877 (1999).
295. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 606–10.
296. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1571 (2006).
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More significant was the majority’s deep concern that state
officials cannot be trusted with the power to waive an entitlement that truly belongs to the citizens, who might have distinct
interests from their elected representatives.297 This is a more
formidable concern, as the personal interests of elected officials
and those of the constituents they represent can never be completely aligned. Nevertheless, while this gap between the interests of principals and agents is endemic in all fields where
primary interest holders are represented by others, the gap is
actually less problematic in the anti-commandeering context
than in others that the Court seems to accept as a consequence
of our representational democracy.
The problem that the New York decision identifies—that
state representatives may not faithfully execute the best Tenth
Amendment interests of their citizens298—is a species of the
well-researched genera of what negotiation theorists call the
The principal-agent tension is
principal-agent tension.299
created by the subtle disconnects between the personal interests of the principal and her bargaining agent that pervade all
negotiations carried on by representatives.300 For example, an
agent paid by the hour may proceed more deliberately than if
paid a flat fee, even if the principal is more interested in speed
in the first case or care in the second. Voters’ interests may
best be served by tackling a thorny dilemma as soon as possible, but their elected official might ignore opportunities until
after the election to mitigate the personal costs of any political
fallout. Thus, although this aspect of the agent-accountability
problem is a valid concern, it is also one that applies to all legislative products of elected representation (including the sorts
of state legislative decision making that the Court approves in

297. New York, 505 U.S. at 182–83 (noting the “possibility that powerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal interests”).
298. See id.
299. See ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 69–91 (2000) (describing the principal-agent tension); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 287
(Taylor & Francis e-Library 2003) (1942) (describing how a “government’s dependence” upon voting “forces upon the men at or near the helm a short-run view”);
McGinnis & Somin, supra note 44, at 90 (arguing that judicially enforceable federalism constraints are needed because elected state officials will consent to federalism violations against the interests of their constituents, though conceding that
this problem is least severe in the anti-commandeering context).
300. See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 299, at 75–76.
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opposition to Tenth Amendment bargaining).301 Should this
particular context of state-federal bargaining be different?
The Court clearly thought so, heralding the vertical separation of powers as a cornerstone of American federalism, but
closer analysis belies the proposition. If anything, this context
is the one in which we can least fear the distorting effects of the
principal-agent tension because the nature of Tenth Amendment state sovereign authority affords the greatest overlap between the private interests of individual citizens and their
elected representatives, whose only claim to power lies in that
very authority. Both citizens and state officials benefit by retaining as much local authority as possible, except when the
problem they wish to resolve requires as constrained a sacrifice
of this authority as possible.302 But state representatives will
be particularly jealous of Tenth Amendment–protected state
authority; if they were too free in bargaining away these entitlements, they would soon find themselves out of work.303 (If
anything, we might fear the reverse problem—in which the citizens would benefit from waiver of an entitlement that the representative refuses to alienate—but this was clearly not the
Court’s concern.)
Meanwhile, we trust elected state representatives to make
legislative trade-offs against all sorts of other constitutionally
protected interests that are valued much differently at the individual and state level, where the principal-agent tension is
much more pronounced. State legislatures can pass laws that
constitutionally burden individual citizens’ free speech (as narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restrictions), even
though those are speech rights specifically held against the
government.304 Similarly, state legislatures pass laws that
burden their citizens’ equal protection interests all the time,
and they can do so on any rational basis so long as no protected
class is implicated.305 It is much more likely that there could

301. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (arguing that Congress may negotiate with
state governments to achieve federal goals rather than compel state performance).
302. See supra note 175 (analogizing to the contract law principle that we bind
ourselves to promises that compromise our autonomy when the autonomyenhancing benefits of being bound outweigh the initial outlay).
303. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text (discussing that statefederal collusion is unlikely in an anti-commandeering context).
304. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115–17 (1972) (holding
that reasonable time, place, and manner regulations of free speech may be necessary to further significant governmental interests).
305. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961).
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be a gap between the interests of individual citizens and their
state representatives in vindicating these more classic individual rights because—as previously discussed—these are rights
that individual citizens hold against the state. Yet in these
contexts, where the principal-agent tension is that much more
palpable, we do not hesitate to allow the state to burden them
by the legislative decision making of elected representatives.
By contrast, when legislators bargain with their state’s sovereign authority—the precious commodity that is the basis for
their own authority to legislate about anything—we can feel
comparatively secure that they will share their constituents’
interests in conservatism. The principal-agent tension will always be most pressing when the right in question is one exercised by individuals one at a time against the state, and less so
as the right is more cognizable as a collective one, like those
described by the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. An entitlement to legislative decision making seems far from the prerogative of any one individual citizen, even though individual
citizens benefit from it collectively. Even those who defend the
need for judicially enforceable federalism constraints on principal-agent grounds (worrying that state officials will sell out
their constituents’ interest in state sovereignty for careerist
gains) acknowledge that the lack of potential for officials’ personal gain in negotiating around commandeering constraints
fortifies this bargaining realm against a threat more pressing
in other federalism contexts.306
Whether the Tenth Amendment entitlement protects an
individual or a collective right, the close overlap between citizens’ and representatives’ interests in their states’ sovereign
authority means that Tenth Amendment bargaining will be
more resistant to the distorting effects of the principal-agent
tension than most other legislative arenas in which elected officials make trade-offs against constitutionally protected rights.
Moreover, the Court’s solutions to the problem it identifies—
state legislative decision making about federal proposals for
spending-power deals or cooperate-or-be-preempted choices307—invite the same kinds of principal-agent conflicts in negotiations that further strain accountability. These problems

306. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 44, at 119. However, these authors nevertheless support the inalienability of the anti-commandeering entitlement. Id. at
118–20.
307. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1992).
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make it hard to understand what the inalienability rule provides that is preferable to a property rule approach.
3.

The State Compact Problem

Finally, the majority’s defense of the Tenth Amendment
inalienability rule on both nature and necessity grounds was
substantially undermined by dicta implying that even though
New York State could not waive its citizens’ entitlement to the
federal government in negotiating a resolution to the crisis, it
might have succeeded in doing so had it joined an interstate
compact and waived the same sovereign authority directly to
other states.308 The decision suggests (without deciding) that
the disputed take-title provision—which the majority considered part of the Act requiring the formation of interstate
waste disposal compacts but not part of the interstate compacts
themselves309—might have been binding had New York promised to abide by the provision within the actual terms of an interstate compact it joined pursuant to the Act:
Nor does the State’s prior support for the Act estop it
from asserting the Act’s unconstitutionality. While New
York has received the benefit of the Act in the form of a few
more years of access to disposal sites in other States, New
York has never joined a regional radioactive waste compact.
Any estoppel implications that might flow from membership
in a compact thus do not concern us here. The fact that the
Act, like much federal legislation, embodies a compromise
among the States does not elevate the Act (or the antecedent discussions among representatives of the States) to the
status of an interstate agreement requiring Congress’ approval under the Compact Clause. That a party collaborated with others in seeking legislation has never been understood to estop the party from challenging that legislation
in subsequent litigation.310

The Court’s conclusion that the states’ earlier negotiations did
not rise to the level of a compact is unremarkable, but the implications of the passage are striking. The suggestion that New
York’s lawsuit might have been estopped had the state bar308. Id. at 183.
309. Even this is a disputed point; in his dissent, Justice White interpreted the
relevant interstate compacts as incorporating the Act’s take-title provision by reference. Id. at 194–96 (White, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 183 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
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gained away its sovereign authority with other states rather
than the federal government betrays the heart of the Court’s
rationale that state officials may not waive an entitlement that
does not belong to them. If the entitlement is inalienable by
state officials to Congress because it really belongs to individual citizens, how could it nevertheless be alienable by state officials to the officials of another state?311 If the entitlement belongs to the citizens, what difference does it make whether the
sovereign to whom their elected officials waive it is the federal
or a separate state government?312
The discrepancy casts doubt on the Court’s assertion that
the Tenth Amendment entitlement is inalienable because it
protects individuals. It is unclear why a state could waive an
individual entitlement by joining a compact that requires congressional approval, but not after negotiating for the same
waiver in direct congressional legislation independent of the
compact. The same rights are at stake in both contexts, and
the interstate-compact medium certainly does not enable states
to waive other constitutional rights held by individuals. For
example, the New England states could not form an interstate
compact to deny residency status to minorities, even with congressional consent,313 nor could the southeastern states form a
compact to deny members of the Republican Party the right to
speak in a public forum.314 But that is the absurd implication
of the Court’s suggestion that the result of the case might have
311. We might also consider the perverse implications were the Court to choose
consistency by holding that a state could not waive its sovereign authority in either context: a compact like the ones embedded within the Act would be impermissible, no matter the need. However, the proposition is undermined by the existence of hundreds of interstate compacts in which states do waive some degree
of Tenth Amendment sovereignty to other states or to an interstate commission.
See, e.g., Klamath River Basin Compact of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-222, 71 Stat. 497,
502–05 (1957); Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, MINN. STAT. §
243.1605 (2008); Interstate Compact for Juveniles, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-368
to -368.01 (2003).
312. Note that New York did not definitively decide that a state could waive its
Tenth Amendment protected sovereign authority by joining a compact, only that it
might be able to do so. 505 U.S. at 183. The decision suggests that had New York
joined a compact in which the take-title penalty was made an explicit part, then
its bid to be released from the bargain might have been vitiated by an estoppel
claim unavailable in the context of challenging federal legislation. But would entering into a compact under one part of the Act imply consent to another part that
is otherwise unconstitutional?
313. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting state action that discriminates
on the basis of race).
314. Cf. id. amend. I (prohibiting state action that interferes with citizens’ political speech).
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been different had New York followed the other of the two
permissible paths outlined by the Act—had it joined a compact
that required it to site a facility, rather than attempting to site
an in-state facility on its own.
The best counterargument is probably that the relevant
Tenth Amendment entitlement is not really a positive one for a
zone of state sovereign authority but a negative one against
federal interference with that authority. If this were so, the
state could waive the same sovereign authority to interference
by another state without triggering the citizens’ separate entitlement to federal noninterference in that zone of state authority. Under this analysis, the question really becomes one
about the content of the Tenth Amendment entitlement: regardless of who has the power to waive it, is the entitlement
really about a zone of state sovereign authority that cannot be
interfered with by any outside sovereign, including another
state (we can call this the “positive entitlement”), or about a
prohibition on federal interference in state affairs (“the negative entitlement”)? But in fact, and as suggested in the earlier
references to the Hohfeldian framing of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,315 neither depiction of the entitlement truly stands without the other. Indeed, this is exactly what the
Court tells us in New York:
In a case like these, involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are
mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a
power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.316

The existence of the positive entitlement’s zone of state jurisdiction implies at least a presumption of federal noninterference, while the negative entitlement’s restriction is meaning315. See supra note 285.
316. 505 U.S. at 156; see also id. at 159 (“In the end, just as a cup may be half
empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue
in these cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of
discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth
Amendment. Either way, we must determine whether any of the three challenged
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
oversteps the boundary between federal and state authority.”); id. at 177.
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less unless it refers to noninterference within a specific zone of
state sovereign authority. So any answer to this question must
include both a positive and negative component, and the only
question is whether the negative component protects state sovereign authority from interference by any outside sovereign,
or only the federal government.
In Federalism and the Tug of War Within, I argue that the
best understanding of the entitlement is as a (positive) jurisdictional zone of sovereign authority coupled with a (negative)
presumption against interference by the jurisdictional competitor that may be overcome in the interjurisdictional gray area
where state and federal zones may occasionally overlap.317
Overcoming the presumption requires demanding scrutiny under a standard that weighs the overall harms and benefits to
all federalism values. By this view, any entitlement to noninterference is strong at the two uncontroversial ends of the
state-federal jurisdictional spectrum (constituting the vast majority of the total), but weak in the gray area. Federalism and
the Tug of War Within did not consider jurisdictional competition that might come from beyond the state-federal continuum
(i.e., another state), but the relevant inquiry seems the same:
whether the waiver of sovereign authority in any case would
advance or detract from the fundamental federalism values
that give meaning to the Tenth Amendment.
Regardless, the Court’s reasoning in New York fails to resolve the problem. If a state may not waive its citizens’ entitlement to the federal government but may to another state,
the Court must assume that the only relevant entitlement is
the negative entitlement to federal noninterference. But as established above, this elides the positive entitlement to a zone of
state sovereign authority that must accompany the negative
entitlement. If the state can still trade on the positive entitlement with the right bargaining partner, then this contradicts
the Court’s stated characterization of the entitlement not as a
state prerogative but as a right belonging to individual citizens,
which would seem to deserve protection from trade to either
the federal government or any another sovereign state.
On a pragmatic level, it is also worth noting that limiting a
state’s ability to bargain with its sovereign authority to the sole
arena of interstate compacts would make it harder for interstate compacts to be effective because interstate compacts (like
317.

Ryan, supra note 2, at 658–67.
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international laws) are easy to get out of and thus hard to enforce.318 No matter what states may promise upon entering a
compact, they can generally withdraw from compacts simply by
repealing their own enacting state legislation, leaving compacting states vulnerable to strategic bargaining moves that may
ultimately undermine the accomplishment of interstate bargaining goals. Indeed, this is exactly what New York State
sought to do in the case of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act: it took advantage of the Act’s initial benefits (extended deadlines enabling it to use South Carolina as a lowcost radioactive-waste dumping ground for an additional twelve
years) until the bargain no longer seemed appealing, then left
its partner states holding the proverbial bag. The unfairness of
New York’s behavior offends common law contract sensibilities,
which may be why the Court held open the possibility that New
York might be held to account for its strategic behavior by a
state within the breached compact, even if not by the federal
government suing for violation of the underlying federal law.319
And, indeed, when the Act’s compacts were uncoupled from the
independently enforceable take-title threat, it failed to deliver
on its goal of creating a national network of disposal sites.320
Could the scheme have worked if the take-title penalty had
simply been included in each individual compact? Probably
not. Interstate compacts are adopted as state law, so including
the take-title provision directly in each compact would have
given the penalty independent legal effect in each participating
state by that state’s own law. However, most states were already failing to comply with their own laws that adopted the
other terms of the compacts—most conspicuously, in failing to
create the mandated disposal sites321—which is why the penalties were needed to begin with. Including penalties in the
compacts but not the independently enforceable federal law
suggests two problems. First, there remains the probability of
ongoing nonadherence to state law and the difficulty of inter318. Cf. John Samples, A Critique of the National Popular Vote Plan for Electing the President, CATO POL’Y ANALYSIS SERIES No. 622 (Cato Inst., Wash., D.C.),
Oct. 13, 2008, at 12–13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462303 (criticizing
a state compact-based proposal to elect the President by popular vote (and thus
without amending the Constitution) because states could always withdraw from
the compact before the election if polling data jarred state representatives).
319. New York, 505 U.S. at 183.
320. See supra Part II.A (reviewing the goals and history of the Act).
321. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Cent. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact
Comm’n, 187 F.3d 982, 984–85 (8th Cir. 1999).
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state enforcement. Worse is the possibility that this approach
could encourage even less compliance with the overall scheme,
by motivating states to refrain from compacts altogether to
avoid vulnerability to the penalty.
Providing an incentive for states to pull out of the compacts they had joined would lead them right back to the collective-action problem that inspired the state-based low-level radioactive waste solution in the first place. Removing the
externally enforceable penalty thus defeated the intentions of
the states that designed the system adopted by the Act. If penalties are limited to the language of interstate compacts because Congress cannot enact them even with states’ consent,
then enforcement problems could undermine interstate compacting goals altogether. A separately enforceable provision
with teeth may be necessary to contain the collective-action
problems that inhibit full participation and enforcement. Indeed, these kinds of freeloader and holdout problems are exactly the sort of collective-action problems that Calabresi and Melamed cite in support of remedy rules that enable bargaining
regimes to realize efficient results.322
In the end, perhaps the best way to understand the New
York inalienability rule is in the very terms that the Cathedral
framework identifies in support of inalienability: it exists to
protect a “moralism” that the Court considered worthy of the
resulting efficiency and autonomy losses.323 But identifying
what is really driving the rule opens the decision up to proper
public scrutiny about that choice, scrutiny it fails to withstand.
CONCLUSION: THE WRONG MORALISM
Weak on its own theoretical terms, the Court’s defense of
the New York inalienability rule is ultimately best explained in
Cathedral terms. Calabresi and Melamed suggest that an inalienability rule is often only justifiable to vindicate a strong
“moralism”—a policymaking consensus about some value so
important that it is worth protecting in spite of the resulting
efficiency and autonomy losses.324 The Tenth Amendment inalienability rule has proven costly in efficiency and autonomy
terms, but it faithfully protects the moralism that underlies the
322. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1106–10.
323. See id. at 1093–98.
324. Id. at 1112; see also Merrill, supra note 12, at 1150, 1156 (discussing a
public law version of this principle).
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New Federalism paradigm. The Court’s reasoning in New York
suggests that it considers the protection of mutual exclusivity
in state and federal jurisdiction so important that the brightline boundary New Federalism draws between them—policed
by the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause—must be
protected even when the parties wish to bridge it, at whatever
practical cost.325 Consistent with the rest of the New Federalism jurisprudence, it exalts the check-and-balance value above
all other federalism considerations, including local autonomy,
interjurisdictional innovation, and interjurisdictional problem
solving.
Federalism values represent a legitimate moralism in the
Tenth Amendment context. But is the check-and-balance value
behind the inalienability rule the right moralism—that is, the
only federalism value that should count in the analysis? Perhaps at the purely state and federal ends of the spectrum
(where intergovernmental bargaining is not necessary), but not
in the interjurisdictional gray area—where problem-solving
values are in heightened tension with checks and balances, because the assignment of a regulatory problem to one or the other jurisdictional realm is unproductive toward its resolution.
The New Federalism’s mutually exclusive jurisdictional
spheres are essentially arbitrary at their margins, presenting
exactly the case the Cathedral authors make for when an entitlement-shifting rule is necessary: when there is significant
uncertainty about where to assign the initial entitlement. In
the end, bargaining might be the best way to honor all relevant
federalism values simultaneously—from checks to localism to
problem solving—because a state would not pragmatically shift
its entitlement to sovereign authority against its own interests.
Allowing states to bargain with their entitlements—and, significantly, to lead in the intergovernmental negotiating process—
strengthens the role of the states in the federal system while
opening up regulatory possibilities for dealing with issues on
which neither side can be the proverbial “least cost avoider” on
its own.
325. The majority effectively acknowledged that its opinion was driven by this
concern in its discussion of the purposes of dividing state and federal authority.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992) (“ ‘Just as the separation
and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’ ” (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
458 (1991))).
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In previous work, I have argued that the New Federalism
has undermined the balance between competing federalism
values that have long served our system of government, and
suggested that federalism theory evolve toward a model that
better mediates between them.326 But even if that route is
never taken, this Article shows how a modest modification of a
jurisprudentially created remedy rule could help relieve the
tension building in the gray area. Even taking the rest of the
New Federalism jurisprudence as it stands, the Court should
retreat from the New York inalienability approach and protect
the substantive anti-commandeering rule with a property rule
that would enable consensual state-federal bargaining, facilitating the negotiation of novel regulatory partnerships in the
gray area while respecting state autonomy. State sovereignty
should include the ability to bargain.
If the anti-commandeering entitlement is the proper subject of bargaining, does that mean that states should be able to
bargain away any fundamental aspect of sovereignty? Of
course not. Ultimately, we evaluate whether a federalism entitlement should be waivable in the same terms as any other
constitutional entitlement: if allowing remedial waiver would
undercut the purpose of the normative element of the rule,
then the entitlement should be treated as inalienable. For example, allowing a state to waive its equal suffrage in the Senate would undercut the representational ethic of Article I. Allowing Congress to redraw state boundaries would undermine
the federalism values that give the Tenth Amendment its
meaning to begin with. But allowing remedial waiver of the
anti-commandeering entitlement—at least in the interjurisdictional gray area—advances those values more faithfully than
any of the alternatives.
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See Ryan, supra note 2.
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